Fukushima: a disaster made in Japan

Fukushima: A Disaster "Made in Japan" - Behavioral Aspects of a Between-Society Intercultural Situation
Published 13.3.22 in response to the Ukraine crisis & updated 9.4.22

I wrote this report on the cultural aspects of the Fukushima disaster in 2015 as part of a master's degree in intercultural competence. As the world teeters on the brink of a disastrous nuclear world war triggered by Ukraine, my intuition tells me that I should publish this report, for it provides insights into deep cultural differences. Of course, we are not talking of Russians in this report, but we are talking of Americans, who might understand from reading this the extent to which Russians may view the present crisis in a diametrically different way. Such misunderstandings have already led to catastrophic wars and intractable conflicts. Above all, at this dangerous time, we need to listen to and understand each other.

I taught these cultural principles to hundreds of UN staff in Austria, Ethiopia, Italy, Kosovo, Lebanon and Mali over a period of 12 years in a specially designed intercultural writing course, and those staff found what I told them about intercultural communication revelatory, not only for their work, but often for their own intercultural marriages. Unfortunately, I was never able to reach the diplomats working for the UN member states as I had no brief to do so. Hence, sadly and dangerously, those engaged in diplomacy through UN channels, such as at the Security Council, may have no idea how radically different their perspectives and interpretations can be from those of people of other cultures.

The report provides an account of how the Japanese mishandled the Fukushima disaster and contrasts American and Japanese relevant cultural features. It exposes a morass of lies and connivance on the part of all those concerned, including UN entities and their nuclear-power-wielding member states. If people understood what went on - and still goes on every single day with no prospect of a solution being found even 100 years from now - in the ongoing Fukushima disaster, we would no longer have a nuclear industry.

If bad actors deliberately escalate the Ukraine crisis into nuclear war, we would not survive it. Now the British Prime Minister Boris Johnson is using the Ukraine situation to announce the accelerated building of eight new nuclear reactors in tiny Britain. Read this report and you will understand why such a proposal must be stopped.

Source: Radiation sources and effects in people. Bobby R. Scott, PhD. LRRI (n.d.)

“[T]he … accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented. … “How could such an accident occur in Japan, a nation that takes such great pride
in its global reputation for excellence in engineering and technology? … Our report catalogues a multitude of errors and willful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared
for the events of March 11. And it examines serious deficiencies in the response to
the accident by TEPCO, regulators and the government.

“For all the extensive detail it provides, what this report cannot fully convey – especially to a global audience – is the mindset that supported the negligence behind this disaster. What must be admitted – very painfully – is that this was a disaster ‘Made in Japan’. Its fundamental causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to ‘sticking with the program’; our groupism; and our insularity.”

National Diet of Japan (2012). Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, Executive Summary: Message from the Chairman, Kiyoshi Kurokawa

Contents
1.       A between-society intercultural situation
2.       The cultural context in which the Fukushima Daiichi disaster took place
           2.1            Japanese society under the Shogunate
           2.2            Government and justice under the Shogunate
3.       Cultural contrasts: United States and Japan
           3.1            Communication style
           3.2            Independence and interdependence/individualism and collectivism
           3.3            Contrasting attitudes to responsibility
           3.4            Contrasting attitudes to consistency and deception
           3.5            Time
           3.6            Power distance
           3.7            Masculinity
           3.8            Uncertainty avoidance
           3.9            Long-term orientation
           3.10         Indulgence
4.       Deep cultural differences and the Fukushima disaster
         4.1            Introduction
           4.2            Deception
           4.3 Discrimination
           4.4 Devotion to sticking with the program and reluctance to question authority
           4.5 Groupism and responsibility
           4.6 Insularity
           4.7 Reflexive obedience
5.       Conclusion
           5.1            Ongoing consequences of an ongoing disaster
           5.2            Conclusion
Tables
           1.              Communication preferences
           2.              Preference for independence (individualism) or interdependence (collectivism)
           3.              Contrasting tendencies in attitudes to responsibility
           4.              Contrasting attitudes to consistency and deception
           5.              Contrasting tendencies in uncertainty avoidance dimension
References

Abbreviations

ALPS advanced liquid processing system
FDEC Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination and Decommissioning Engineering Company (branch or division of TEPCO)
FEPC Federation of Electric Power Companies
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IOC International Olympic Committee
Kantei Prime Minister’s Office
mGy milligray (1 mSv is the dose produced by exposure to 1 milligray (mG) of radiation)
mSv/y millisieverts per year (1 mSv = 0.001 Sv)
μSv microsievert (1 μSv = 0.000001 Sv).
NAIIC Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission
NDF Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation
NHK Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai - Japan Broadcasting Corporation
NRC US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
METI Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry
NISA Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
NSC Nuclear Safety Commission
PCV primary containment vessel
SDS Specially Designated Secrets Protection Act
SPEEDI System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information
TEPCO Tokyo Electric Power Company
UNSCEAR United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
WHO World Health Organization

Workers at a contaminated home in Naraha, Fukushima. Credit Ko Sasaki for The New York Times.

1. A between-society intercultural situation

The accident in Japan at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant on 11 March 2011 led to three meltdowns and the partial destruction of a suspended spent fuel rod storage facility containing “14,000 times the amount of cesium that was dropped on Hiroshima” (Koide 2015). The ongoing disaster has been closely followed by Arnie Gundersen of Fairewinds Energy Education, a US non-profit organization whose mission is to educate the public about nuclear power production, engineering, reliability and safety issues (Fairewinds 2015a).

After reporting on the status of Fukushima Daiichi for three years, making many trips to Japan as an unofficial adviser, speaking at conferences and being invited by a Japanese publisher to write a book about the disaster, in a radio broadcast in 2014 (Fairewinds 2015b), Gundersen said that he could not understand how the Japanese had made such a hash of the response to the accident, commenting that, of all the nationalities in the world, he would rather have the Japanese dealing with such a disaster. Yet Gundersen’s view is at odds with the observation of the Chairman of the 2012 Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, who stated that the accident was “made in Japan”; that it was “a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented”.

This paper will provide a brief overview of the cultural factors that may account for the mishandling of the ongoing Fukushima Daiichi disaster, for the resolution of which no technology exists or may ever exist, according to the Chief of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (Global Research 2015). Had Gundersen been aware of these factors, not only could he not have made the remark that he did, but he might also have adopted different strategies in his dealings with the Japanese and in his regular reports on the handling of the ongoing disaster by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). For, as Buruma (2009, p. xv) observed, “[i]t would be naïve – and it has proved to be dangerous in the past – to assume that culture doesn’t matter, that all human beings can be cast in the same universal mold”.

2. The cultural context in which the Fukushima Daiichi disaster took place

There's been a quantum leap technologically in our age, but unless there's another
quantum leap in human relations, unless we learn to live in a new way
towards one another, there will be a catastrophe.

Albert Einstein, 1879-1955

In his Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity, Bennett (1986, 1993) records the third point on a scale of six as “minimization”, a relatively unsophisticated level of intercultural competence at which people may expect similarities and trivialize or romanticize another culture, thereby obscuring deep cultural differences. People who come into regular contact with other cultures may over time develop this level of intercultural sensitivity, but are unlikely to move beyond it without training or study.

Crown Prince Naruhito and Princess Masako, 1993

Japan has indeed been both trivialized and romanticized. It may have been inadvertently trivialized by the US, given Japan’s own sense of inferiority and vulnerability after its defeat at the hands of the US in World War II, which formed the basis for their “big brother-little brother relationship” (Rickards, 1991: 699). This defeat was in a sense their second, since it was the US that forced Japan – after 250 years of insularity -- to open up to US trade in 1853, when Commodore Perry’s gunboats threatened Tokyo, which brought about the collapse of the Shogunate and the modernization of Japan (History.com 2010). The opening up of a country that had developed in isolation from the rest of the world induced a fascination with Japan that has continued to the present day. This, together with the sensational debut of Japanese arts in the West (Jirousek 1995), may have contributed to the romanticization of Japan in the minds of non-Japanese.

This trivialization and romanticization do indeed obscure the “deep cultural differences” (Bennett 1986, 1993) existing between Japan and the US. It is these differences that Kiyoshi Kurokawa, Chairman of the 2012 Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC), felt had contributed to the disaster: the reflexive obedience, the reluctance to question authority, the devotion to “sticking with the program”, the groupism and the insularity (NAIIC 2012, p. 9).

Kurokawa’s assertion about the connection between the Fukushima disaster and Japanese culture is supported by many others, including actor-turned-politician Taro Yamamoto. Explaining the Japanese expression “read the air” (Yamamoto 2014, 2:47), he says that it is a “Japanese unspoken rule about not speaking out individually” and means not saying what you think, but looking around and not disturbing the air, the connection with others. He explains how this prevents Japanese from speaking out about the power of industry and government. Other Japanese, nuclear dissenters and Fukushima residents, speak out against collusion, corruption and complacency in a video produced by the Labor Video Project (2012). Ruff (2012) criticizes the high level of dysfunction, cover-up, collusion and corruption in the nuclear industry – including its regulation and oversight. And Tomoya Yamauchi, an expert in radiation measurement at Kobe University who helped Fukushima communities test the effectiveness of various decontamination methods, said that “Japan … started up its big public works machine, and the cleanup … [became] an end in itself. It’s a way for the government to appear to be doing something for Fukushima.”

A brief survey of Japan’s history under the Shogunate and current cultural features may serve to elucidate what Kurokawa meant when he said that Fukushima was “a disaster made in Japan”. Italicization is used to highlight factors in Japanese history that may have influenced present-day Japanese culture, an understanding of which may illuminate both the events that occurred at Fukushima on 11 March 2011 and the actions taken in reaction to the disaster by Japanese decision-makers.

2.1 Japanese society under the Shogunate

Tokugawa Ieyasu, first shogun of the
Tokugawa Shogunate

The Tokugawa dynasty (1603-1867) used divine power in the name of the (puppet) emperor to maintain legitimate authority that was beyond question (vanSteenburgh 2006). Society under the Shogunate conformed to a strict hierarchical class structure of warrior, farmer, artisan and merchant. The people who lived below this four-tier system (lepers, comedians, prostitutes, beggars) were considered non-people and called burakumin; they were also largely outside the purview of any governmental body.

Although discrimination against families descended from the burakumin is outlawed, even today they still frequently face discrimination, notably in hiring and marriage (Szczepanski n.d.). This Confucian system was based on the ideal of maintaining the status quo and the idea that superiors ruled by example; their subordinates had no rights per se, but rulers had a moral duty to treat subordinates correctly. The law would step in to punish a failure of this moral duty rather then to vindicate the rights of the victims. Under the Shogunate, Japanese people were forbidden to travel abroad and those who were already abroad were not permitted to come home (vanSteenburgh 2006).

The Shinto and Buddhist clergy existed outside of the regulation of the feudal government and effectively settled disputes among themselves. In order to eliminate Christianity, all Japanese subjects were ordered to register at a Buddhist or Shinto temple. In village codes, there appear articles such as: “The peasants are investigated every month, and comings and goings are checked with the pertinent temple in each case to verify affiliation” (Ooms 1996, p. 353). During the Meiji period (1868-1912), Zen Masters nurtured absolute obedience to an expansionist state, collaborated with Japanese fascism and gave Zen training to military men (Jones 1989, p. 212).

2.2 Government and justice under the Shogunate

The shogunal government was called the bafuku, a term derived from the military structure of the Shogunate. To clarify the roles of bafuku intendants, the Shogun promulgated the Kujikata Osadamegaki in 1742; this was a “secret” manual issued to administrators only. There was no word that directly translated as “rights” so the bafuku used the Dutch term regt to denote this foreign concept (vanSteenburgh 2006).

The legal system of Tokugawa Japan had two distinct jurisdictions that rarely interacted: the shogunal government and the village government. Most village conflicts were settled by mediation and a common punishment was ostracism. Most merchants organized themselves into self-regulating guilds that handled their own disputes, enforced largely by threats to reputation. When a samurai passed, members of the lower classes were required to bow and show respect. If a farmer or artisan refused to bow when a samurai passed by, the samurai was legally entitled to chop off the recalcitrant person's head (vanSteenburgh 2006).

3. Cultural contrasts: United States and Japan

Despite the importance of understanding culture in a globalized world, firm definitions remain elusive. Bennett (1998) states that “[i]t is more useful to frame cultural information in general value contrasts … than to discuss particular aspects of interaction between two particular cultures”. It should be noted, however, that nations do not have single cultures and individuals make their own choices. The value contrasts described below may be stronger or weaker in certain individuals in different circumstances and should therefore be seen as indicative rather than absolute. They are explained here in an attempt to cast light on potential significant differences in perspectives between the peoples of the United States and Japan. The following are considered to be those most likely to yield useful insights: communication style, independence and interdependence, responsibility, consistency and deception, time, power distance, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term orientation and indulgence. Italicization has been used for emphasis.

3.1. Communication style

Japan is one of the most homogeneous societies in the world, where communicative competence means “the ability to send and receive subtle, unstated messages” (Kim 2002, p. 38), while the US is one of the most heterogeneous societies in history (Clark 2014), where clarity is paramount, for precision leads to practical action (Stewart 1991, p. 55, cited in Kuntjara 2004).

Japanese speakers do not make a main point, but circle a topic delicately to imply its domain, for “the direct and clear statement of opinion or intention feels invasive and pushy” and the “receiver is expected to be sensitive to the overall situation” or context. English speakers are more expressive and … Japanese more impressive (Bennett 1998, p. 124-125). Receiver-oriented languages such as Japanese prefer non-linearity, may contain digressions and include related material (Lustig and Koester 2010, p. 226-227).

In the high-context communication typical of Japan, information is shared through networks of people, such that most of the information resides in the interlocutors and therefore does not need to be explicitly communicated. Messages tend to contain detail and are ornate, a main point may be hinted at rather than stated and digression is frequent. The written message is less important than the constellation of understanding, often unexpressed, between the transmitter and receiver. Low-context cultures, such as the US, rely on detailed, unambiguous messages (Weiss 2005, p. 134; Panetta 2011, p. 50). Low-context communication tends to be explicit; the main point is stated early and the communication stays on topic, while details seen as unnecessary and context may be eliminated.

“In low-context negotiation [US], what people ‘understand’ may be superseded by what actually appears, black on white, in the written papers. In a low-context culture, vaguely written forecasts are indicative of either fuzzy thinking or an unwillingness to commit; in a high-context culture [Japan], deliberate ambiguity and imprecision is a sign of maturity, a humble appreciation of the impossibility of predicting the future” (Weiss 2005, p. 135).

In East Asia, reality is conceived of as a totality with built-in contradictions, evolving over time. Since the first rule for Japanese is not to harm pre-established relations in terms of respect for authority and verticality, they prefer vagueness even in daily discourse (Galtung 1981). The intellectual approach in Japan is described by Galtung (ibid.) as consisting not of exploring paradigms or scrutinizing theory formation, but more of mapping intellectual territory or “the encyclopedia/dictionary approach to intellectual commentary”, which suggests description rather than analysis and is associated with interdependence or group identity, which encourages respect for authority, uniformity, conformity and harmony. Galtung concludes that the two sides are striving for different objectives: “the occidental mind seems to have a fear of inconsistency, ambiguity, contradiction, and strives to obtain images that are contradiction-free; the oriental mind strives for the opposite and not necessarily for any linguistic reason, but simply because the underlying cosmology contains very different visions of how reality is constituted”. In other words, while the Western mind is primed for binary logic, the Eastern is primed for multivalent logic.

The contrasts between the communication preferences of the United States and Japan are summarized in table 1 below.

3.2 Independence and interdependence/individualism and collectivism

Only 30 per cent of the world’s people are individualists, far outnumbered by the 70 per cent who are collectivists (Triandis 1989, cited in Kim 2002, p. 5). In individualist societies people are supposed to look after themselves and their direct family only, whereas in collectivist societies people belong to ‘in groups’ that take care of them in exchange for loyalty.” (Hofstede & others n.d.).

People in individualistic cultures (independents) take as their point of reference the self: they believe in autonomy, independence and privacy and take decisions on the basis of what is good for the individual. People in collectivistic cultures (interdependents) take as their point of reference the group. They may promote uniformity, conformity and harmony by suppressing their individualism and not trying to compete or show off (Suseno 1996, p. 39, cited in Kuntjara 2004). Decisions are taken based on what is best for the group, and the group is expected to take care of its individual members.

East Asians emphasize connection with, rather than separation from, others and the surrounding context (Lebra 1992, cited in Nisbett 2005, p. 16). These preferences are inculcated from an early age: in Japan, babies are seen as too individualistic and in need of training to become connected, whereas in the US, babies are seen as too connected and in need of training to become individuals (Klein 1995, cited in Kim 2002, p. 12).

The contrasts between the preferences for individual or group action of the United States and Japan are summarized in table 2 below.

North Americans have a preference for egalitarianism and achieved status, whereas East Asians accept hierarchy and ascribed status. Japanese respect authority and avoid questioning, while North Americans tend to readily contest authority (McCool 2009, p. 23). And North Americans have a spirit of competition and a belief that conflict can be productive, whereas East Asians show a concern to preserve the harmony of the group by acting cooperatively.

Japan is less collectivistic than most of her Asian neighbors. Hofstede (n.d.) attributes this to the absence of an extended family system such as exists in, for example, China and Korea and to the paternalistic nature of Japanese society, with the family name and assets being usually inherited from father to the eldest son. Although Japanese are famous for their loyalty to their companies, this loyalty is something that people have chosen for themselves, which is an individualistic thing to do. Japanese are experienced as collectivistic by Western standards and experienced as individualistic by Asian standards. They are more private and reserved than most other Asians.

3.3 Contrasting attitudes to responsibility

Responsibility for behavior in the modern West resides primarily with the individual (dispositionism), whereas the focus in East Asia is on the whole context in which behavior takes place (contextualism) (Kim 2002, p. 83). Nisbett (2005, pp. 111-113) describes a study in which Chinese and US newspaper articles reporting two violent shooting incidents in the US, for which a Chinese and an American were responsible respectively, were studied to determine where causes had been attributed. In the Chinese articles, there was a clear preference for cause to be attributed to context, while in the US articles cause was mainly attributed to the personal attributes of the individuals concerned.

North Americans tend to the belief that the rules governing proper behavior should be universal, whereas East Asians have a preference for particularistic approaches that take into account the context and the nature of the relationships involved (Nisbett 2005, p. 61).

The contrasts between the contrasting tendencies in attitudes to responsibility of the United States and Japan are summarized in table 3 below.

3.4 Contrasting attitudes to consistency and deception

Independents [US] and interdependents [Japan] view deception differently: “Message responses that are considered to be deceptive by independents may not be viewed as deceptive by interdependents and vice versa”. Independents [US] interact with a bias towards truthfulness, whereas interdependents [Japan] are concerned with preserving face (their own and that of others), such that they may consider deception to be unavoidable. Further, since interdependents [Japan] usually place responsibility for the interpretation of a message on the receiver, the responsibility of a deceiver is reduced. Interdependents [Japan] are also more likely to use irrelevant assertions as a response strategy (Kim 2002, pp. 109-119).
Consistency is not expected by interdependents [Japan], as being influenced by others and changing one’s stance is not a sign of inconsistency, but rather reflect self-control, flexibility and maturity (ibid., p. 81) North Americans expect consistency between the public and the private self and call inconsistency between statements and behavior hypocrisy, whereas Japanese place value on being polite and maintaining harmony and consider a person’s true feelings not important (ibid., p. 80). This could be associated with Westerners’ conception of self as a machine and that of Japanese as deriving from nature, analogous to a plant (ibid., p. 82).

The contrasting attitudes to consistency and deception of the United States and Japan are summarized in table 4 below.

3.6 Power distance

Power distance expresses the attitude of the culture towards inequalities. It is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally (Hofstede & others n.d.).

Although foreigners may perceive Japan as hierarchical because of the slow decision-making process, in which all decisions must be confirmed by each hierarchical layer, in fact Japanese are less hierarchical than most other Asian cultures. There is no single autocrat who can hand down a decision. Japanese are always conscious of their hierarchical position in any social setting and act accordingly, but in terms of its education system Japan is meritocratic: any child able to succeed in examinations will be granted social and economic advancement.

3.7 Masculinity

Japan is one of the most masculine societies in the world. Competition does not take place between individuals, however, but between groups, from kindergarten up to the company. Further expressions of masculinity in Japan are the drive for excellence and perfection in every aspect of life and the exclusion of women from positions of authority. Japan is famous for its excessive workaholism, sometimes to the point of death (過労死 or karoushi). Japan has been ranked first for workaholism in a survey attempting to identify the people least likely to use their vacation days, while Americans were ranked fifth (Goldman 2011). The survey found that Japanese use only 33 per cent of their vacation days, while Americans used 57 per cent. However, in terms of the number of hours worked, the US average was higher than the Japanese: 1,768 hours per year as compared to Japan’s 1,714.

3.8 Uncertainty avoidance

“Uncertainty avoidance” reflects the degree to which people experience stress and anxiety in situations that are unstructured, unclear and unpredictable. Collectivistic (interdependent) cultures [Japan] tend towards high uncertainty avoidance, making them more reliant on rules and plans and more likely to follow procedure regardless of circumstances (Gladwell 2008, p. 27), while individualistic (independent) cultures [US] regard uncertainty as normal; people tend not to show their emotions, to believe in relative truths, to support scientific enquiry and to assume equality (Liu, Volčič and Gallois 2011, p. 105 and McCool 2009, p. 18).

Japan is one of the most uncertainty avoiding countries on earth. This is often attributed to the fact that Japan is constantly threatened by natural disasters from earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons to volcano eruptions and landslides. Under these circumstances, Japanese learned to prepare themselves for any uncertain situation. This is true not only for the emergency plan and precautions for sudden natural disasters but also for every other aspect of society. You could say that in Japan anything you do is prescribed for maximum predictability. From cradle to grave, life is highly ritualized and you have a lot of ceremonies. For example, there [are] opening and closing ceremonies of every school year, which are conducted almost exactly the same way everywhere in Japan. At weddings, funerals and other important social events, what people wear and how people should behave are prescribed in great detail in etiquette books. Schoolteachers and public servants are reluctant to do things without precedence. In corporate Japan, a lot of time and effort is put into feasibility studies and all the risk factors must be worked out before any project can start. Managers ask for all the detailed facts and figures before taking any decision. This high need for uncertainty avoidance is one of the reasons why changes are so difficult to realize in Japan.” (Hofstede & others n.d.). Contrasts between the US and Japan in the uncertainty avoidance dimension are summarized in table 5 below.

3.9 Long-term orientation

Societies that score low on the dimension of “long-term orientation” prefer to maintain time-honored traditions and norms and view societal change with suspicion. Those that score high tend to encourage thrift and efforts in modern education as a way to prepare for the future (Hofstede & others n.d.).

Japan is one of the most long-term oriented societies in the world. Japanese see their life as a very short moment in a long history of mankind and tend towards fatalism. People live their lives guided by virtues and practical good examples. Investment in R&D is maintained even in economically difficult times and priority is given to steady growth of market share rather than to a quarterly profit (Hofstede & others n.d.).

By contrast, the US is one of the most short-term oriented societies in the world. American businesses measure their performance on a short-term basis, with profit and loss statements being issued on a quarterly basis, and Americans strive for quick results within the workplace. Americans tend to have a “can-do” mentality and are prone to analyze new information to check whether it is true. The US is one of the few “Caucasian” societies in which church attendance increased during the twentieth century (Hofstede & others n.d.).

3.10 Indulgence

The dimension of “indulgence” describes the extent to which people try to control their desires and impulses, based on the way they were raised. Relatively weak control is called “indulgence” and relatively strong control is called “restraint”. Cultures can, therefore, be described as indulgent or restrained.

Japan has a culture of restraint and is typical of societies with a low score in this dimension, having a tendency to cynicism and pessimism. Restrained societies such as Japan do not put much emphasis on leisure time and control the gratification of their desires. People with this orientation have the perception that their actions are restrained by social norms and feel that indulging themselves is somewhat wrong (Hofstede & others n.d.). A key word in Japan is gaman (我慢), which is of Zen Buddhist origin and means "enduring the seemingly unbearable with patience and dignity” (Wikipedia n.d.).

“The United States scores as an indulgent society … [with] contradictory attitudes and behavior.” Americans tend to “work hard and play hard”; despite its war on drugs, “drug addiction in the States is higher than in many other wealthy countries”, and despite being “a prudish society … even some well-known televangelists appear to be immoral” (Hofstede & others n.d.). In contrast to the Japanese belief in endurance, the American Declaration of Independence grants Americans the right to the pursuit of happiness.

4. Deep cultural differences and the Fukushima disaster

It is better to be unhappy and know the worst, than to be happy in a fool's paradise.

Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Idiot

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will provide examples of events that took place before, during and after the disaster at Fukushima on 11 March 2011, as well as comments on those events, with a view to explaining by use of a cultural lens why the disaster and its consequences to date have been handled so badly. The examples will be grouped according to the cultural factors and some of the sharp cultural contrasts between the US and Japan examined above: deception, discrimination, devotion to sticking with the program and reluctance to question authority, groupism and responsibility, and insularity and reflexive obedience.

4.2 Deception

Japan has a long history of corruption at the highest levels dating back hundreds of years. Since the 1950s, Japan’s so-called nuclear village, comprising the utilities, nuclear vendors, bureaucracy, Diet (Japan’s parliament), financial sector, media and academia, has effectively and profitably promoted nuclear energy through lies and complicity. This cozy relationship has resulted in TEPCO forging documents, falsifying data, and faking repairs on its nuclear plants for decades. Even after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, TEPCO has continued its policy of deception, inventing its own definition of “cold shutdown” after the accident so that it could claim a state of cold shutdown for its Fukushima Daiichi reactors, which in fact had melted through the bottom of the containers and could therefore never be in a state of cold shutdown as previously defined.

It took TEPCO five months after the accident to finally admit to massive leaks of radiation-contaminated water into the Pacific Ocean and even in 2015, TEPCO admitted to having known for 10 months without alerting the public that radioactive substances were flowing freely into the sea. Only after Japan's new nuclear watchdog had expressed alarm in 2013 at TEPCO's own reports of huge spikes in radioactive cesium, tritium and strontium in groundwater near the shore did TEPCO start to investigate. The lying continued with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stating, in a 2013 bid to reassure the International Olympic Committee (IOC) before Tokyo was picked as host of the 2020 Games, that the radioactive water had been “completely blocked” within a 0.3-square-kilometer area in the harbor of the Fukushima Daiichi plant and that Japan “would never allow contaminated water to threaten the capital”, only to be hastily contradicted by a senior TEPCO official, who said that the radioactive water leakage at the crippled Fukushima plant was not, in fact, under control. This ongoing inability to stem the flow of contaminated water is confirmed by the 2015 reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

As a result, many Japanese citizens no longer trust what the government says or does, particularly those who feel abandoned after the Fukushima Daiichi accident and who now realize that they have been lied to for decades and are now being lied to about the decontamination program. Because they do not trust the government’s numbers, many residents of the affected areas are conducting their own tests of the radiation levels in their neighborhoods: one, for example, found radiation levels nearly 100 times those found in Tokyo. US nuclear cleanup experts who went to Japan in 2011 to demonstrate their expertise to the authorities (but who were subsequently not employed by them) found radiation levels 1,000 times background, higher in spots, which in the US would have required their wearing radiation-protection suits, gloves and respirators. Meanwhile, around them local people continued with their daily lives, blissfully unaware of the danger.

Former Assistant Professor of Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute, Hiroaki Koide, speaking in 2015, accuses the Japanese government of having “binned” the people living in the affected areas and insists that the regions of Tohoku and Kanto, which includes Tokyo with its population of 40 million, should all be designated radiation-controlled areas because of the amount of cesium 137 that has fallen on those regions. Koide is supported by a scientific article from 2011 stating that the Fukushima disaster had prompted “the largest radioactive noble gas [xenon-133 and cesium-137] release in history not associated with nuclear bomb testing and that the entire noble gas inventory of reactor units 1–3 was set free into the atmosphere between 11 and 15 March 2011. NISA, however, also in 2011, estimated the amount of radioactive material released into the atmosphere to have been only approximately 10% of the 1986 Chernobyl accident. A year later, however, NAIIC reported that approximately 900PBq of radioactive substances had been emitted, amounting to 16% of the amount of emissions from the Chernobyl accident.

Finally, in 2015, perhaps awakening to the enormity and irresolvability in any foreseeable future of the problem they had caused, officials started to admit the truth. The Chief of the Fukushima nuclear power station, Akira Ono, admitted that the technology needed to decommission the three melted-down reactors does not exist and he has no idea how it will be developed. And Naohiro Masuda, President of TEPCO’s decommissioning company, revealed that he cannot comply with the government plan for removing the fuel because he does not believe that it is possible.

However, the campaign of deception is not all on the part of the Japanese authorities. It is a global campaign directed at the highest international levels. Although the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) have neatly corroborated each others’ findings, a careful reading of their reports (of 2012 and 2014 respectively) reveals that these findings are based on hot – if not rather radioactive – air. For in fact, the chaos that reigned in the first days of the accident prevented any reliable data from being collected, and therefore WHO based its estimates on guestimated data “reconstructed” by TEPCO. WHO acknowledges this in the title of its report, the end of which reads, “based on a preliminary dose estimation”. The body of the WHO report states that it based “its assessment on the occupational doses estimated by the operator TEPCO because this was the only exposure data available at the time of this assessment”.

In its own, 2014 report, UNSCEAR states that it did not use all available datasets and in fact used “models extensively to support its assessments”. It admitted that “there were uncertainties in the estimation of doses from short-lived radioactive substances”. UNSCEAR announces, however, that its findings “are scientifically consistent with the early WHO findings”. Yet paradoxically it admits the total unreliability of those findings by conceding that WHO’s data were based on fantasy: “[m]easurements were not available in the first few days because of the disruption caused by the tsunami and the accident. Existing infrastructure had been wiped out and power was not available. The immediate focus was on the important task of saving lives. These and a host of other factors impeded the data-collection process in Japan.” UNSCEAR’s “findings” must therefore be regarded as unfounded.

And in fact, other reports do contradict UNSCEAR’s findings. Its statement in its 2014 report that “For one-year-old infants, the district-average thyroid dose in the most affected areas was estimated to be up to about 80 mGy” [80 milligray = 80 millisievert], did not accord with a report a year earlier from a research team that levels for infants could have exceeded 100 millisieverts”. UNSCEAR’s assurance that there was only a “[t]heoretical increased risk of thyroid cancer among most exposed children” was in contradiction with the findings of the tenth Fukushima Prefecture Health Management Survey (data up to 21 January 2013), which were that “44.2 per cent of 94,975 children sampled had thyroid ultrasound abnormalities”.

(McCormack 2011, Spector 2012, NAIIC 2012, p. 58, Tabuchi 2013, ABC News 2011, NEI 2011, Russia Today 2013d, Gutierrez 2015, Keller 2013, Sputnik 2015, Reuters 2013, Koide 2015, Stohl & others 2011, IAEA 2015a, NAIIC 2012, p. 38, Parry 2015, NHK 2015, WHO 2013, pp. 45-46, UNSCEAR 2014, Oiwa 2012, Russia Today 2013a)

A non-exhaustive list of instances of deception related to the Fukushima Daiichi disaster follows.

“TEPCO has forged documents, falsified data, and faked repairs on its nuclear plants for decades. Japan has a serious corruption problem at the highest levels and a long history of corruption broadly speaking dating back to the Heian period.” (Spector 2012)
“TEPCO has often been accused of concealing information about the crisis and many details have first emerged in the press. In July, TEPCO finally admitted to massive leaks of radiation-contaminated water into the Pacific Ocean after months of media reports and denials by the utility.” (Spector 2012)
“[T]he lies and complicity between the nuclear industry, Japanese government, and researchers from universities … is referred to in Japan as the ‘nuclear power village’ to connote ‘the nontransparent, collusive interests’.” (Spector 2012)
“The ‘nuclear village’ is the term commonly used in Japan to refer to the institutional and individual pro-nuclear advocates who comprise the utilities, nuclear vendors, bureaucracy, Diet (Japan’s parliament), financial sector, media and academia. This is a village without boundaries or residence cards, an imagined collective bound by solidarity over promoting nuclear energy. If it had a coat of arms the motto would be ‘Safe, Cheap and Reliable’. There is considerable overlap with the so-called ‘Iron Triangle’ of big business, the bureaucracy and Liberal Democratic Party that called the shots in Japan from the mid-1950s, and the evocative moniker ‘Japan, Inc.’, a reference to cooperative ties between the government and private sector. The nuclear village is convenient shorthand to describe a powerful interest group with a specific agenda, one that it has effectively and profitably promoted since the 1950s.” (McCormack 2011)
“There have been reports that since the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant meltdown began, many Japanese citizens no longer trust what the government says or does because of the way it and TEPCO have responded to the nuclear disaster.” (Spector 2012)
Comment by a resident of Naraha: “When I attended a lecture for local residents by TEPCO soon after the company hid an accident from the public, TEPCO said they not only had the first 3 layers of protection, but also the 4th and 5th layers of measures for safety, with an attitude that the attending residents would not understand what it means to have so many layers for safety. Now I realize all of what TEPCO explained was lies, and that I was deceived.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 58)
“I thought Japan was a technologically advanced country. I thought we’d be able to clean up better than this,” said Yoshiko Suganami, a legal worker who was forced to abandon her home and office over two miles from the Fukushima Daiichi plant. “It’s clear the decontamination drive isn’t really about us any more.”(Tabuchi 2013)
In order to be able to announce that the three reactors at Fukushima Daiichi were in cold shutdown, TEPCO invented a new definition for the term: “Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda told a meeting of his nuclear taskforce that the crippled reactors ‘have reached a state of cold shutdown to the point where the accident is now under control’. … (Step Two) means the reactors have continued to be in a stable condition for some time, so we can consider that they are now under control,’ said Takashi Sawada, vice chairman of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan. … [He] stressed the use of the term ‘cold shutdown’ … did not indicate that all four disaster-hit reactors were now safe. " (ABC News 2011)
“In Fukushima Daiichi’s case, achieving the strict definition of ‘cold shutdown’ is not possible because the RPVs [reactor pressure vessels] have been breached. This means that the RPVs will not hold water (currently the cooling water is flowing through them) and some of the melted fuel may not be in the vessel, but rather on the floor below, which is still within the primary containment.”
“TEPCO … developed a new term, ‘cold shutdown condition,’ which applies to how they are bringing the reactors to stable condition. Their definition is as follows:
- “Temperature of RPV bottom is, in general, below 100 degrees Celsius.
- “Release of radioactive materials from PCV [primary containment vessel] is under control and public radiation exposure by additional release is being significantly held down. (Not exceed 1 mSv/y at the site boundary as a target.)
“By their definition, the Fukushima Daiichi reactors will reach ‘cold shutdown condition’ once they are below boiling point and are no longer releasing significant amounts of radiation into the atmosphere. This new definition, thus, has an important distinction between the more commonly used ‘cold shutdown,’ which typically takes place at a nuclear plant under normal conditions.” (NEI 2011)
Prime Minister Shinzo “Abe, in a bid to reassure the IOC before Tokyo was picked as host of the 2020 Games, said that the radioactive water [had] been ‘completely blocked’ within a 0.3-square-kilometer area in the harbor of the Fukushima No. 1 plant. He continued that Japan would never allow contaminated water to threaten the capital.” … “A senior TEPCO official contradicted Abe by saying the radioactive water leakage at the crippled Fukushima plant is not under control. …” (Russia Today 2013d)
Because they do not trust the government’s number, Muto and her fellow plaintiffs have conducted their own tests of the radiation levels in their neighborhoods. One test, conducted near a school in Fukushima city, registered radiation levels nearly 100 times that found in Tokyo. … “I feel angry,” Muto said. “I think the authorities hide the real dangers and now many more children are being diagnosed [with thyroid cancer].” (Gutierrez 2015)
“The radiation levels we were seeing were 1,000 times background, higher in spots,” Industrial hygienist Sam Engelhard said. “If we had been working on a site this contaminated in the US, we would have been fully suited up in radiation protection suits, gloves, and respirators. Yet people were walking around and going about their business, with no idea of how contaminated everything around them was.” (Keller 2013)
TEPCO “has been slammed by fishermen, for knowingly allowing radioactive substances to flow freely into the sea for ten months. … Operators of the tsunami-stricken Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant admitted that a drainage ditch allowed highly-contaminated water to flow into the sea, and that the leak was first detected back in May 2014.” (Sputnik 2015)
“Two and a half years after the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl, the operator of Japan's wrecked Fukushima plant faces a daunting array of unknowns. … Why the plant intermittently emits steam; how groundwater seeps into its basement; whether fixes to the cooling system will hold; how nearby groundwater is contaminated by radioactive matter; how toxic water ends up in the sea and how to contain water that could overwhelm the facility's storage tanks. … What is clear, say critics, is that [TEPCO] is keeping a nervous Japanese public in the dark about what it does know. … It investigated only after Japan's new nuclear watchdog expressed alarm earlier this month at Tepco's own reports of huge spikes in radioactive cesium, tritium and strontium in groundwater near the shore.” (Reuters 2013)
“The Japanese government has issued a declaration that this is an emergency situation. As a result, normal laws do not have to be followed. … Over 100,000 people are not able to return to their homes. They’ve basically ‘binned’ the people who live in those areas. … The cesium 137 that’s fallen onto Japanese land in the Tohoku and Kanto regions [the Kanto region includes Tokyo and is home to over 40 million people], so much so that this area should all be put under the radiation control area designation.” (Koide 2015)
Koide is supported by a study stating that the Fukushima disaster prompted “the largest radioactive noble gas [xenon-133 and cesium-137] release in history not associated with nuclear bomb testing. … The entire noble gas inventory of reactor units 1–3 was set free into the atmosphere between 11 and 15 March 2011.” (Stohl & others 2011)
By contrast, NISA estimated that “the amount of radioactive material released to the atmosphere [was] approximately 10% of the 1986 Chernobyl accident”. (IAEA 2015a)
That figure was again contradicted by NAIIC, which stated that, “As a result of the accident, approximately 900PBq of radioactive substances were emitted, 1/6 [16%] the amount of emissions from the Chernobyl accident when converted to iodine”. (NAIIC 2012, p. 38)
The title of the WHO report on the health consequences of the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi acknowledges that the data used for its assessment were “based on a preliminary dose estimation”. These estimates were provided by TEPCO: the report explains that, “[t]o evaluate health risks related to occupational exposure, the HRA Expert Group agreed to base its assessment on the occupational doses estimated by the operator TEPCO because this was the only exposure data available at the time of this assessment.” WHO goes on to reveal that the data provided were in fact guestimates for they were “reconstructed”: “[o]wing to the extremely complex situation following the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident, the collection and reconstruction of data regarding workers’ dosimetry are ongoing processes. Therefore, the estimates of workers' doses … should be considered as preliminary in nature.” (WHO 2013, pp. 45-46)
The Fact Sheet on UNSCEAR Fukushima Report (2014) admits that UNSCEAR cherry-picked its data:
- “All datasets had to be deemed ‘fit for purpose’ before being used in the analysis [and s]ome datasets were not used directly in the assessment [but only] for comparison and relevance checks. As a result, the Committee had to use models extensively to support its assessments. This means that there were uncertainties in the estimation of doses from short-lived radioactive substances.”
- It bolsters its findings by stating, however, that they are consistent with the conclusions of the WHO Health Risk Assessment Report. Yet WHO, by its own admission, based its assessment on the occupational doses estimated by the operator “TEPCO because this was the only exposure data available at the time of this assessment” (WHO, p. 45). The UNSCEAR Fact Sheet goes on, in fact, to reveal that the data used by WHO have no validity, since “[m]easurements were not available in the first few days because of the disruption caused by the tsunami and the accident. Existing infrastructure had been wiped out and power was not available. The immediate focus was on the important task of saving lives. These and a host of other factors impeded the data-collection process in Japan.”
- Having thus established the unreliability of the data sets it and WHO used, UNSCEAR goes on to state the following “findings”:
  - “Cancer rates to remain stable
  - “Theoretical increased risk of thyroid cancer among most exposed children” (UNSCEAR adds the following reassuring observation: “However, thyroid cancer is a rare disease among young children, and their normal risk is very low.”)
  - “No impact on birth defects/hereditary effects
  - “No discernible increase in cancer rates for workers
  - “Temporary impact on wildlife.”
The Fact Sheet on UNSCEAR Fukushima Report states that “For one-year-old infants, the district-average thyroid dose in the most affected areas was estimated to be up to about 80 mGy” [80 milligray = 80 millisievert (TranslatorsCafe n.d.)]. Yet this statement is contradicted by an article that had appeared in the Asahi Shimbun newspaper two years earlier: “‘Levels could have exceeded 100 millisieverts if infants had stayed in a district with a high iodine concentration,’ said professor Shinji Tokonami, who led the research team.” (Oiwa 2012).
The claim in the UNSCEAR Fact Sheet of only a “[t]heoretical increased risk of thyroid cancer among most exposed children” is discredited by the high numbers of thyroid abnormalities reported by another article, which had appeared one year before the publication of the Fact Sheet. “The Tenth Report of the Fukushima Prefecture Health Management Survey … with data up to January 21, 2013, revealed that 44.2 percent of 94,975 children sampled had thyroid ultrasound abnormalities. … The report has also revealed that 10 of 186 eligible are suspected of having thyroid cancer as a result of the exposed radiation.” (Russia Today 2013a).

Now that most people believe that the disaster has been dealt with and have shifted their attention elsewhere, perhaps TEPCO feels it safe to start to admit the truth:

“The chief of the Fukushima nuclear power station, Akira Ono, has admitted that the technology needed to decommission three melted-down reactors does not exist, and he has no idea how it will be developed.” (Parry 2015)
Naohiro Masuda, president of TEPCO’s decommissioning company, revealed that he cannot comply with the government set plan for removing the fuel: “It’s a very big challenge. Honestly speaking, I cannot say it’s possible.” (NHK 2015)

4.3 Discrimination

It should come as no surprise that the Fukushima disaster has given rise to discrimination, given that descendants of Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bomb victims (called hibakusha) still face discrimination more than 60 years later because people think them contagious and that marrying them or their descendants would produce babies with birth defects. Many children from Fukushima face similar discrimination (Aoki 2013). In addition, subcontractors at Fukushima Daiichi, since the disaster frequently employed through yakuza (the Japanese mafia) (Ruff 2012), have complained of second-class treatment compared with TEPCO employees (NAIIC 2012). Some examples of discrimination are given below.

There are reports of school children from Fukushima who have since relocated to other schools being bullied by other students for being ‘contaminated’. Cars with Fukushima license plates are being vandalized and have been denied gas station service in other prefectures.” (Spector 212)
“In Japan, the Fukushima disaster has … left those exposed vulnerable to discrimination and stigmatization from others who see them as damaged or contaminated.” (Samet and Chanson 215)
“Though stories about Fukushima are being leaked, many are being muzzled not only by the central government [which] has abandoned the villagers of Namie but by non-Fukushima Japanese citizens who see the people of Fukushima as the culprits.” (Spector 212)
Comments by primary contractor employees:
- “I had no choice but to try to estimate my radiation exposure level in my head. … I was clearly exposed to radiation internally. … The plant was completely isolated and I thought I had been abandoned.” (NAIIC 212, p. 68)
- “The radiation dose management was sloppy right after the accident.” (NAIIC 212, p. 68)
- “I don’t think there was much attention paid to the workers who actually dealt with the accident. The first whole body counter was installed in Iwaki city, but only TEPCO employees were allowed to use it. Other workers had to go all the way to Kashiwazaki, and we almost never saw TEPCO people there.” (NAIIC 212, p. 69)
- “I have worked in a subcontracted company for around four years—during which time I never once experienced evacuation training for a nuclear accident.” (NAIIC 212, p. 7)

· “Approximately 30 per cent of TEPCO workers and 40 per cent of subcontracted workers had not agreed to deal with such an accident.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 65)
“Around 30 per cent of the workers said that they were never told of their cumulative radiation dosage.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 66)

4.4 Devotion to sticking with the program and reluctance to question authority

The Fukushima Daiichi disaster could have been prevented if the 2007 warnings of Katsuhiko Ishibashi, Professor at the Research Center for Urban Safety and Security of Kobe University, had been heeded four years earlier. He warned of a serious policy failure by the Japanese government in not addressing the risk of genpatsu-shinsai, a combination of an earthquake and nuclear meltdown, which could affect Japan’s 55 [2007 figure] nuclear power plants. He had already been proved right in July 2007 when a major power plant badly planned and operated by TEPCO had been damaged in an earthquake (Ishibashi 2007).

In his 2007 article, Ishibashi suggested that government, industry and academics had become complacent after 40 years of low seismic activity and had consequently underestimated the risk of a “nuclear catastrophe”. He pointed out that recent earthquakes that had occurred in close proximity to three nuclear power plants had been much stronger than the seismic design criteria for nuclear power plants. He criticized the guidelines for being “seriously flawed because they underestimate[d] design basis earthquake ground motion”. He argued that the guidelines should require that a nuclear power plant, no matter where it [was] located, should be designed to withstand at least the ground acceleration caused by an earthquake of about a 7.3 magnitude, roughly 1000 gal., and pointed out that the guidelines revised in 2007 require[d] only about 450 gal (Ishibashi 2007). The Fukushima quake registered 9 on the Richter scale and there have been several large nearby quakes since then.

(Xinhua 2010, Before It’s News 2011, Lehmann 2013, World Nuclear Association 2014)

Ishibashi stated that even “the system to enforce [the new guidelines was] in shambles”, that TEPCO’s design for the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant was given only a “shoddy” examination, and called the nuclear safety authorities irresponsible for overlooking “an active fault line”, pointing out that the “person responsible for the underestimation of the fault line [was] still in an important position on the panel of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency". He accused the Nuclear Safety Commission of being “susceptible to government intervention” and recommended that “[t]he Diet should take a good look into the government's flawed nuclear safety policy along with the problems caused by the recent earthquake for a radical reform of the government approach to ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants”. (Ishibashi 2007)

When the complacency excoriated by Ishibashi finally gave rise to the Fukushima disaster, chaos reigned. The UNSCEAR report describes the “disruption caused by the tsunami and the accident. Existing infrastructure had been wiped out and power was not available” (UNSCEAR 2014). Everything was mishandled: subcontractors at the nuclear power plant were not instructed what to do and not adequately protected or monitored for radiation exposure, the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) correctly predicted the initial path of the heaviest Fukushima fallout and the results were delivered to the government but not acted on, resulting in the people of some towns moving right into the path of the fallout. Residents were initially not evacuated, later not informed officially that they should evacuate, and many were evacuated to areas with higher levels of radiation, or evacuated repeatedly, some as many as six times. The NAIIC report revealed that most residents had received no information on what to do in the event of a nuclear emergency or training in nuclear safety.

Some examples of and data on the Japanese tendencies to stick with the program and avoid questioning authority are provided below.

TEPCO’s manual for emergency response to a severe accident was completely ineffective, and the measures it specified did not function. (NAIIC, p. 33)
“Had the head office of TEPCO actively communicated the onsite situation from the start, and explained the severity of the situation to the other parties, there is a possibility that the distrust—and the confusion in the chain of command that followed—could have been prevented.” (NAIIC, p. 33)
”We felt the raw anger of the residents as shown by the following comments: ‘We had to evacuate without any information from the government, the prefecture, or TEPCO about the accident itself, instructions on the evacuation, or in which direction we should evacuate.’ ‘There should have been someone, such as a TEPCO employee, providing information at earlier stage.’ “The people from the towns hosting nuclear power plants were so used to hearing ‘how safe the plants are.’ ‘We had been brainwashed.’ ‘I had never thought that a nuclear power plant could become a problem.’ ‘There was no communication about potential issues which are out of human control.’” (Mayor Baba of Namie town and Mayor Watanabe and other witnesses at the 10th and 11th Commission meetings, 21 and 22 April 2012. NAIIC 2012, p. 76)
Comments by primary contractor employees (NAIIC 2012, p. 68):
- “Measures taken in response to the accident were uncoordinated and poor overall.”
- “ The first waves of the tsunami arrived while I was leaving, yet there were no announcements about tsunami.”
Many residents were evacuated six times or more:

Source: NAIIC 2012, p. 50.

“Even at the plant itself, there was little explanation of the possibility of a nuclear accident. Less than 15 percent of residents reported receiving evacuation training for a nuclear disaster and less than 10 percent of residents reported receiving explanations about the possibility of a nuclear accident.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 50)

Source: NAIIC 2012, p. 57.

Virtually none of the subcontracted employees received any explanation from TEPCO about hazardous conditions in the reactors (NAIIC 2012, p. 630):

Source: NAIIC 2012, p. 63.

“Meanwhile, the government also failed to assume a severe accident or a complex disaster in its comprehensive nuclear disaster drills. As the scope of the drills expanded, they lost substance, and were performed for cosmetic purposes, rather than to develop preparedness. The irrelevant drills were lacking instruction in the necessity of using tools such as the radiation monitoring information from SPEEDI [System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information]. Though it was applied in the annual drills, participants found the drills useless at the time of the accident. (NAIIC 2012, p. 39)

However, there are some positive signs that cultural change is occurring as some people assert their right to speak out. One example came in the form of the outraged response to the introduction in 2014 of a new secrecy law, the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (SDS), which many suspected was intended to hide the true extent of the consequences of the ongoing Fukushima disaster. The new law “fails the international standards on many fronts and completely disregards the Japanese citizen's right to know. The SDS Act provides only minimal guidance on what information may be classified and does not exempt any categories of information from classification, such as those with high public value. … Criminal penalties will apply to journalists and government whistleblowers who "improperly" obtain or who legitimately expose government misconduct.” (Halperin & Hofsommer 2014) “Under the new law, government employees who leak secret information could face up to 10 years in prison; journalists who solicit such information could get 5-year sentences. Opponents object to the vagueness of what constitutes state secrets and the absence of any third-party oversight on what government officials can designate a secret.” (Normile 2013)

“Fortunately many of Japan’s most famous scientists … have led the opposition against this new state secrecy legislation with 3,000 academics signing a public letter of protest. These scientists and academics declared the government’s secrecy law a threat to ‘the pacifist principles and fundamental human rights established by the constitution and should be rejected immediately’.” (Nader 2014)
“[T]he very fact that there was an independent commission examining what went wrong at Fukushima attests to ‘break[ing] with precedent in Japan’.” (Spector 2012)
“Prefecture court in Japan has ruled that the only real protection from a catastrophic nuclear accident is to keep the nation’s atomic reactors shut down. Hideaki Higuchi, a local judge for Fukui, ordered that the Takahama nuclear power plant remain closed as there is not adequate proof that another disaster caused by an earthquake can be reliably averted if the atomic reactors are operating. Judge Higuchi had previously ordered that the Ohi nuclear plant in Fukui also remain closed for the same reason. Judge Higuchi’s Takahama order overruled Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority’s decision to restart under revised regulatory standards. In spite of the Abe government’s push to restart atomic power, Japan remains ‘Zero Nuclear’ by popular demand and legal authority.” (Beyond Nuclear 2015)

4.5 Groupism and responsibility

The disaster was the result of collusion between TEPCO, the government and the regulatory agencies and was avoidable, as evidenced by the survival of a nearby nuclear plant at Onagawa, which suffered the same earthquake and tsunami, if anything more intensely. Few of those in authority took responsibility and many wrongly blamed the tsunami or other people; the President of TEPCO completely failed to take responsibility. The true hero of the hour was Masao Yoshida, who elected to stay at the plant and defied orders by letting in seawater to cool the reactors. He died two years later of esophageal cancer. Below are given some examples of Japanese groupism and avoidance of responsibility.

Former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan said that the Fukushima nuclear disaster was “a mistake of those responsible. They simply did not do what was required. The cause of the catastrophe was not the earthquake and tsunami. While Kan recognizes that mistakes were made (as the political expression goes), his words do not make clear who is responsible.” (Spector 2012).
NAIIC concluded that TEPCO was fully responsible for the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and it was not attributable to the tsunami:

o   “Our report catalogues a multitude of errors and willful negligence that left the Fukushima plant unprepared for the events of March 11. And it examines serious deficiencies in the response to the accident by TEPCO, regulators and the government.
o   “… nuclear power became … immune to scrutiny by civil society.
o   “… collective mindset of Japanese bureaucracy … led bureaucrats to put organizational interests ahead of their paramount duty to protect public safety. “The consequences of negligence at Fukushima stand out as catastrophic, but the mindset that supported it can be found across Japan. In recognizing that fact, each of us should reflect on our responsibility as individuals in a democratic society.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 9).

“At the time of the accident, neither the Chairman nor the President of TEPCO were present or accessible, an inconceivable situation for an operator of nuclear power plants.” (NAIIC, p. 33)
The Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yukio Edano, conveyed his view to the President of TEPCO, Masataka Shimizu, that if a full withdrawal of staff from the plant were to take place, deterioration of the state of the plant could not be stopped. Shimizu remained silent and Edano concluded that his preference was for a full withdrawal. By contrast, the General Manager of Fukushima Daiichi, Masao Yoshida, determined to remain at the plant, saying “We’ll do our best”. (NAIIC 2012, p. 77)

“Masao Yoshida remained in charge of the rectification of the consequences of the disaster for more than six months, barely leaving the station. … It was Yoshida’s own decision to disobey HQ orders to stop using seawater to cool the reactors. Instead he continued to do so and saved the active zones from overheating and exploding. Had he obeyed the order, the whole of north eastern Japan would possibly have been uninhabitable for decades, if not centuries. … ‘It was clear from the beginning that we couldn’t run,’ Masao Yoshida said. ‘Nobody on the ground said anything about pulling out of the site.’” (Russia Today 2013b)
Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced: “Rather than blaming any individual person I believe everyone has to share the pain of responsibility and learn this lesson.” (Spector 2012)
Banri Kaieda, a member of the House of Representatives and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) at the time of the accident, said that, “from immediately after the breakout of the accident, communicating and sharing information among the accident site, the Kantei, and TEPCO headquarters was like the telephone game ‘whispering down the line’.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 78)
“A probe by an independent parliamentary panel found that collusion between regulators and the nuclear power industry was a key factor in the failure to prevent the meltdowns at [TEPCO]'s tsunami-hit Fukushima plant in March 2011, and the government and the utility remain the focus of criticism for their handling of the on-going crisis.” (Spector 2012)
“An independent Japanese parliamentary report recently concluded that the government, in collusion with industry, attempted ‘to avoid responsibility by putting all the blame on the unexpected (the tsunami)’.” (Spector 2012)
“Rather than empathizing with concerned citizens about their anxieties, the Japanese government has responded by calling for a stop to citizens taking radiation measurements because the instruments, they say, might not show accurate readings. It has also been reported that the Japanese government blocked 25,000 Geiger counters from coming into the country.” (Spector 2012)
“Within the affected area were three nuclear power plants: the Fukushima Daiichi and Daini nuclear power plants operated by [TEPCO], and the Onagawa Nuclear Power Station operated by the Tohoku Electric Power Company. While the … power stations shared similar disaster conditions, nuclear reactor types, dates of operation, and an identical regulatory regime, their fates were very different. The Fukushima Daiichi plant experienced fatal meltdowns and radiation releases. … Onagawa managed to remain generally intact, despite its proximity to the epicenter of the enormous earthquake.” (Airi & Meshkati 2014)
“Most people believe that Fukushima Daiichi’s meltdowns were predominantly due to the earthquake and tsunami. The survival of Onagawa, however, suggests otherwise. Onagawa was only 123 kilometers away from the epicenter—60 kilometers closer than Fukushima Daiichi—and the difference in seismic intensity at the two plants was negligible. Furthermore, the tsunami was bigger at Onagawa, reaching a height of 14.3 meters, compared with 13.1 meters at Fukushima Daiichi. The difference in outcomes at the two plants reveals the root cause of Fukushima Daiichi’s failures: the utility’s corporate ‘safety culture’.” (Airi & Meshkati 2014)
“Tepco, on the other hand, to make it easier to transport equipment and to save construction costs, in 1967 removed 25 meters from the 35-meter natural seawall of the Daiichi plant site and built the reactor buildings at a much lower elevation of 10 meters. According to [NAIIC], the initial construction was based on existing seismological information, but later research showed that tsunami levels had been underestimated. While Tohoku Electric learned from past earthquakes and tsunamis—including one in Chile on February 28, 2010—and continuously improved its countermeasures, Tepco overlooked these warnings. According to the NAIIC report, Tepco ‘resorted to delaying tactics, such as presenting alternative scientific studies and lobbying.’ … Tepco’s tsunami risk characterization and assessment was, in the judgment of one the world’s renowned tsunami experts, Costas Synolakis, director of the Tsunami Research Center at the University of Southern California, a ‘cascade of stupid errors that led to the disaster’.” (Airi & Meshkati 2014)
Witness Tsunehisa Katsumata, former President of TEPCO and manager of a giant power company that utilizes nuclear power since 2008, stated [in May 2012, 14 months after the disaster] that the causes of the accident were “under investigation at TEPCO.” “[H]is assertion that the unanticipated tsunami was the primary cause was disorienting.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 77)
[Former President of TEPCO] Katsumata “stated that ‘it was the Prime Minister who was the director-general of the emergency response headquarters, where judgment at the plant site needed to be prioritized.’ Also the top three management members (president, chairman, and vice president) were unavailable when the accident broke out.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 77)
“The public should determine … if [Former President of TEPCO Katsumata] was sufficiently competent to be the top manager of a giant power company that utilizes nuclear power.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 77)
“The Japanese government and [TEPCO] have not been forthcoming about the extent of the nuclear disaster, a disaster that could have been avoided if those in charge had acted more responsibly.” (Spector 2012)
“[L]ittle empathy, displacement of responsibility, and denial toward the dangers of the ongoing radiation emissions to the extent of burning radioactive debris back up into the atmosphere.” (Spector 2012)
Witness Katsutaka Idogawa, Mayor of Futaba: “Ever since I was appointed as the mayor, I kept expressing our concern about the nuclear power plant to TEPCO and [Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency] NISA. It is outrageous that TEPCO claims the radiation released from its power plant is bona vacantia, an ownerless object for which they cannot be held accountable. (NAIIC 2012, p. 73)
Witness Katsutaka Idogawa, Mayor of Futaba. “After we evacuated, there were no communications whatsoever from the government. Television was the only source of information.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 73)

4.6 Insularity

The NAIIC report revealed that the various nuclear safety guidelines in force in March 2011 were outdated and defective. It asserted that Japan had a responsibility to establish safety standards and guidelines that were trustworthy at a global level. It further found both the nuclear regulatory agencies wanting in terms of their ability to protect the surrounding residents and the nation.

Approaches by foreign firms experienced in nuclear cleanup were rebuffed in favor of giving contracts to the very same firms that were responsible for the disaster in the first place. Reasons given for this by a senior official were that the “soil in Japan is different” and foreigners “might scare the old grandmas and granddads”.

The Japanese media, which should have been responsible for holding government accountable, meanwhile enjoyed a similar cozy relationship with government to that of the nuclear industry. As a result of the monopoly access to government granted to so-called kisha clubs in return for their cooperation, public attitudes toward journalism have become increasingly critical of the clubs’ “closed nature, inclination to act in unison and elitism”. Kisha club guidelines were consequently revised in 2006 in order to respond to public criticism.

Ruff (2012) asks three important questions: (1) how sea walls designed to withstand a tsunami of only 5.5 meters could be acceptable on a coast battered by a 38-meter tsunami in 1896 and a 29-meter tsunami in 1933. He also asks (2) how it came about that cooling pumps, back-up generators and control systems were not required to be located on high ground. And (3) how spent fuel ponds filled with vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity, could be considered safely placed right of top of reactors and without any special containment structures. The answer is Japan’s “nuclear village” of colluders in maximizing profit and minimizing public safety.

Some examples of Japan’s insularity are given below.

“Countermeasures not up to international standards”: “As a result of inadequate oversight, the SA [severe accident] countermeasures implemented in Japan were practically ineffective compared to the countermeasures in place abroad.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 28)
Despite the fact that both TEPCO and NISA were aware of the risks, no attempts were made to amend the existing regulations or bring them in line with international standards. NISA gave no compulsory instructions to carry out specific measures, and TEPCO took no action. (NAIIC 2012, p. 43)
The Commission has found that prior to the accident, revision and amendments of laws and regulations were only undertaken on a “patchwork” basis, in response to micro-concerns. The will to make large, significant changes in order to keep in step with the standards of the international community was utterly lacking. (NAIIC 2012, p. 46)
“Outdated guidelines:” Witnesses Haruki Madarame, Chairman, Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) and Nobuaki Terasaka, former Chair, [NISA] stated that the “safety guidelines were defective” and that “the accident in Fukushima emitted far more radiation than the scenarios done in a ‘hypothetical accident’ set in the guidelines, where the scenarios had assumed a significantly smaller scale than the severe accident scenarios used by many other countries.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 73)
“The Guideline for the Reactor Site Evaluation, which was established in 1964, is still in place regarding construction permits for nuclear power plants. It was called outdated during the hearing, and Madarame’s opinion was that the guideline needed to be amended.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 73)
“Lack of preparation by agencies: Both the NSC and NISA had mandates to maintain the safety of nuclear power, yet lacked preparation for emergency situations. Moreover, both the NSC and NISA were found to lack an understanding of their fundamental tasks of protecting the surrounding residents and the nation. (NAIIC 2012, p. 73)
“Insufficient knowledge: The hearing revealed a lack of technical knowledge and nuclear engineering skills by the regulating agencies and the leaders of those agencies. The hearing also reminded everyone about the profound importance of independence and how important decisions and suggestions based on scientific facts and analyses are for those agencies to function properly. Obviously, Japan has a clear responsibility to establish safety standards and guidelines that are trustworthy at a global level.” NAIIC 2012, p. 73
Banri Kaieda, a member of the House of Representatives and Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) at the time of the accident, “made a critical statement about the hydrogen explosions—‘nobody had ever thought of a possible hydrogen explosion at that time.’ … He felt the lessons from Three Mile Island were not utilized.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 79)
“First-hand witnesses have described a deeply flawed reaction to the nuclear meltdown that has been marked by an underestimation of the extent of the contamination, insufficient radiological testing, and a glacially-slow response making cleanup harder as time passes. Most damning of all has been a stubborn unwillingness to use desperately needed cleanup assistance by ignoring technical competence in favor of political influence.” (Keller 2013)
The reasons given by Japanese officials for not making use of foreign expertise approaches the bizarre, including a statement by Hidehiko Nishiyama, Deputy Director of the Environment Ministry, that foreign techniques won't work because "the soil in Japan is different … and if we have foreigners roaming around Fukushima, they might scare the old grandmas and granddads." (Keller 2013)
When revising its Kisha Club Guidelines in 2002 and 2006, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association (Nihon Shinbun Kyokai), tacitly admitted the cozy relationship existing between the club and the government institutions it was reporting on:
- “The kisha club is a "voluntary institution for news-gathering and news-reporting activities" made up of journalists who regularly collect news from public institutions and other sources. … The Committee … made small modifications to the 2002 Guidelines … to bring about a more trusted kisha club system. … [P]ublic attitudes toward journalism have become increasingly critical today. … [It was decided] to define a kisha club proactively and positively as ‘a voluntary institution for news gathering and reporting.’ … Full consideration was given to popular criticism of the kisha club for its ‘closed nature,’ ‘inclination to act in unison’ [and] ‘elitism,’ and it was decided to correct what should be rectified. … [K]isha clubs need to demonstrate in a specific form both domestically and abroad their own raison d'etre, which is to demand information disclosures from public institutions. … [E]mbargoes are actually put into place to ensure ‘accurate and high-quality reports,’ since instant reporting of the disclosed information could lead to harmful results. … [K]isha clubs must not comply with requests from news sources, which could lead to compromising news gathering and reporting. The Committee believes that public institutions, the police force and the prosecutor's offices should not make such demands on kisha clubs.”
After observing the radiation officials’ attempts to use their radiation meters, industrial hygienist Sam Engelhard said, “They didn’t seem to understand what their radiation sensor equipment did, or how to work it.” After pointing out to three Japanese disaster-response officials from various governmental entities that a nearby concrete bench was “hot,” [the US decontamination] team was amazed to see the officials perched on the bench. "I couldn’t believe it," [cleanup expert] Wang said, "After being warned, they sat on the bench, three so-called ‘experts’, needlessly getting a dose of radiation. I had to take a picture.” (Keller 2013)

4.7 Reflexive obedience

NAIIC determined that the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was a manmade disaster that should have been prevented. Although TEPCO and the regulators were aware of the risk from such natural disasters, their failure to put preventive measures in place was the direct cause of the severity of the accident. This complacency was largely attributable to lobbying by the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC). However, the inappropriately cozy relationship between the operators, the regulators and academic scholars was also to blame. There was effectively no oversight of the nuclear industry because the relationship between the operators and regulators lacked independence and transparency. Guidelines on disaster-prevention had been under review for a full five years prior to the accident because of the reluctance of the Nuclear Safety Commission to implement changes and seismic back checks against the earthquake design basis and anti-seismic reinforcement had not been carried out.

When disaster struck, roles and responsibilities were ambiguous and, as more people became involved, distrust and disorder intensified. The direct intervention of the Prime Minister’s Office (the Kantei) made things even worse: decisions were made on an ad hoc basis, cooperation between governmental agencies broke down, evacuation operations were bungled and the public was not informed. The bureaucratic institutions’ awareness of their responsibility decreased and their approach became passive, while the verticality of the various ministries prevented effective information-sharing.

TEPCO was more concerned about the “potential loss of trust in the utility on the part of the public regarding natural disasters and possible decreases in the operation rates of reactors” than it was in the risk of a potentially severe accident and never included such a scenario in its list of risks. Safety drills prior to the accident had become perfunctory and were performed only for cosmetic purposes. The government effectively abandoned its responsibility for public safety, while its intervention at the plant set the stage for TEPCO to effectively abdicate responsibility. TEPCO’s management mindset of “obedience to authority” hindered their response.

For their part, residents and mayors of local municipalities had believed the assurances from the operators that power plants were safe and secure and that an accident would never occur. SPEEDI data revealed high-radiation areas, but residents were not evacuated until one month later. Emergency radiation medical systems were mostly not used because they were located too close to the plant or had too little capacity and too few trained medical personnel. Although Chernobyl had provided information about the need for the administration of iodine and the dose required, none was administered. Workers were not provided with information on environmental dosage. Fukushima schoolchildren were later treated like traitors during the war for not drinking what might have been cesium-contaminated school milk. Even the implementation of decontamination programs after the accident was controversial.

A total of 28% of TEPCO workers, 44% of primary contractors and 38% of secondary and subordinated contractors responding to a NAIIC survey reported not having consented to be assigned to response tasks in the event of an emergency. Comments from one sample contractor reveal that he was given no information about the station blackout and only learned about the emergency evacuation orders from television. While he continued working, TEPCO’s managing director, deputy managing director and radiation protection supervisor all evacuated with their families. When he asked the Tokyo head office three days after the accident if he could evacuate, they refused to allow it. He later told a TEPCO general manager that he wanted to pull out, but “it was very hard to get his consent”. When he did finally leave, he and his colleagues found that the company car that they had been planning to use had already been taken by TEPCO employees. Although he subsequently repeatedly requested a whole body check, his employer refused it. He finally refused to continue working at Daiichi and was deemed to have resigned “for personal reasons”.

(NAIIC 2012, pp. 9, 18, 26, 29, 30, 33, 34, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 43, 44, 58, 66, Majiroxnews 2011 & Ruff 2012)

Examples of the Japanese tendency towards reflexive obedience are provided below.

“Although triggered by these cataclysmic events, the subsequent accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been foreseen and prevented.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 9)

“The Commission concludes that the situation continued to deteriorate because the crisis management system of the Kantei (Prime Minister’s Office), the regulators and other responsible agencies did not function correctly. The boundaries defining the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved were problematic, due to their ambiguity. ” (NAIIC 2012, p. 18)

“In spite of the fact that TEPCO and the regulators were aware of the risk from such natural disasters, neither had taken steps to put preventive measures in place. It was this lack of preparation that led to the severity of this accident. ” (NAIIC 2012, p. 26)

“We also examined the role of the earthquake as a cause of the accident, and the validity of TEPCO’s claim that the tsunami was the sole direct cause.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 29)

“It is thought that the ground motion from the earthquake was strong enough to cause damage to some key safety features, because seismic back checks against the earthquake design basis and anti-seismic reinforcement had not been done.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 30)

“[T]he intervention of the Kantei contributed to the worsening of the accident.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 34)

“Additionally, the Regional Nuclear Emergency Response Team did not take the initiative in the local response to the accident, such as issuing the evacuation order.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 34)

“The senior members of NISA and NSC had joined the group in order to provide advice. They failed, however, to adequately answer questions, leading to a sense of distrust. ” (NAIIC 2012, p. 34)

“Although TEPCO and the regulators had agreed on how to deal with the vent and the injection of seawater, the Kantei was unaware of this, and intervened, resulting in further disorder and confusion. ” (NAIIC 2012, p. 34)

“[T]he Kantei stepped in and ordered the evacuations. This resulted in the following problems: 1) as the decisions were made on an ad hoc basis, there was insufficient cooperation between the governmental agencies; 2) there was a deficiency in the details of evacuation operations; and 3) there was a lack of suitable explanation to the public. This led to an increased state of disorder and confusion on the ground.” (NAIIC 2012, pp. 34-35)

“[T]he direct intervention by the Kantei, including Prime Minister Kan’s visit to the Fukushima Daiichi plant, disrupted the chain of command and brought disorder to an already dire situation at the site.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 35)

“According to the nuclear emergency manual, NISA and the other bureaucratic institutions have the responsibility to collect and organize information for delivery to the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters for use in decision-making. However, with the new route in place between the Kantei and TEPCO, the bureaucratic institutions’ awareness of their responsibility decreased and their approach became passive. The vertical sectionalism of the various ministries involved also prevented effective information sharing.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 36)

“[T]he government’s priority must be its responsibility for public health and welfare. But because the Kantei’s attention was focused on the ongoing problems at the plant—which should have been the responsibility of the operator--the government failed in its responsibility to the public. The Kantei’s continued intervention in the plant also set the stage for TEPCO to effectively abdicate responsibility for the situation at the plant.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 35)

“The Commission concludes that the government effectively abandoned their responsibility for public safety.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 38)

“The fact that some areas within the 30-kilometer zone suffered from high radiation levels was known after the [SPEEDI] data was released on March 23. But neither the government nor the nuclear emergency response headquarters made a quick decision to evacuate residents from those areas; it was only one month later that they were evacuated.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 38)

“The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) started reviewing the disaster-prevention guidelines in 2006 to accommodate new international standards. However, NSC was apprehensive that the residents could become concerned by the necessity of additional defense measures after being repeatedly assured of the safety of nuclear power, and that [residents’] worries might spill over to arguments against the plutonium-thermal project then in progress. NSC failed to explain how the civil defense initiative would benefit the residents, and failed to introduce the international standards in a substantial way. Although revision of the disaster-prevention guidelines continued after 2007, the accident broke out as the review was proceeding.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 38)

“Meanwhile, the government also failed to assume a severe accident or a complex disaster in its comprehensive nuclear disaster drills. As the scope of the drills expanded, they lost substance, and were performed for cosmetic purposes, rather than to develop preparedness.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 39)

“… emergency radiation medical systems … most of the facilities were not used because of their location too close to the plant, their capacity, and the number of trained medical personnel. Those medical institutions with capacity for emergency radiation treatment did not function as anticipated.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 39)

“Although the positive effects of administering stable iodine and the proper timing were fully known [after Chernobyl], the government’s nuclear emergency response headquarters and the prefectural government failed to give proper instructions to the public.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 39)

“TEPCO did not prepare worker safety measures in the case of a severe accident, and information on environmental dosage was not provided to them immediately after the accident.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 40)

“The government is spending massive amounts of financing and energy on decontamination programs, but major issues have arisen regarding the implementation.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 40)

“… fundamental cause lies in TEPCO’s mindset of deference to and reliance on government authority, and the abdication of their own responsibilities, in spite of its position as a private-sector entity.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 33)

TEPCO’s management mindset of “obedience to authority” hindered their response. The confusion over the “withdrawal” comment by President Shimizu and the intervention by the Kantei arose from this mindset. Rather than make strong decisions and clearly communicating them to the government, TEPCO insinuated what it thought the government wanted and therefore failed to convey the reality on the ground.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 33)

The fundamental causes of the accident … can be also traced to the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC). This is an unregulated lobbying association of electric power companies, and thus also bears a share of the responsibility.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 43)

The Commission’s examination of the way safety regulations are deliberated and amended reveals a cozy relationship between the operators, the regulators and academic scholars that can only be described as totally inappropriate.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 43)

The Commission found that the relationship [between the operators and regulators] lacked independence and transparency, and was far from being a ‘safety culture.’ In fact, it was a typical example of ‘regulatory capture,’ in which the oversight of the industry by regulators effectively ceases.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 43)

TEPCO did hold meetings about what it viewed as risks to nuclear power production; such risks were defined as the potential loss of trust in the utility on the part of the public regarding natural disasters and possible decreases in the operation rates of reactors. “The risk of a potentially severe accident never appeared in TEPCO’s list of risks.” (NAIIC 2012, p. 44)

“[A]t the Japanese Upper House Budget Committee meeting (2011), female politician Akira Matsu tells the story of several Fukushima school children, who had already tested positive for cesium, being ‘treated like traitors during the war’ for not drinking what might have been cesium contaminated school milk. In other words, patriotism for a child from Fukushima means that s/he must be ready and willing to die for its prefecture before disgracing it.” Majiroxnews (2011)

“Some [residents] reported receiving an explanation that nuclear power plants were safe and secure, and so thought an accident would never occur.” (NAIIC p. 58)

Comment by a subcontractor employee (NAIIC p. 66):
- “No information whatsoever about the station blackout was delivered to the end-workers like us. I had to learn about the emergency evacuation orders for residents within 20 km of the plant from TV.”
- “Though I was a subcontracted worker, I had to work on a 24 hour shift based on my existing contract.”
- “My employer knew there were several employees like me staying in the main anti-earthquake building. However, the company’s managing director, deputy managing director and radiation protection supervisor all evacuated with their families.”
- “I finally managed to call our Tokyo head office on March 14, but they were not aware that there were still employees working in the main anti-earthquake building. I asked to evacuate, but they declined my request. I hardly ate or slept and I was reaching my mental and physical limits.”
- “I later told a general manager of TEPCO that I wanted to pull out, but it was very hard to get his consent.”
- “We found that the company car we were planning to use had been taken by TEPCO employees, but a colleague gave us a ride.”
- “I repeatedly requested a whole body check from my employer in late March and April, but my request was always denied.”

Source: NAIIC 2012, p. 67.

“I was assigned to work at Daiichi at the end of April, which I refused to do because of health concerns. As a result I was later subjected to power harassment from my employer and I became mentally unbalanced. Because of this, I had to leave the company in June, which they termed a ‘resignation for personal reasons.’”
“’Tokyo Electric has been playing a game of whack-a-mole with problems at the site,’ Trade and Economy Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said in a televised interview.” (Russia Today 2013c)

5. Conclusion

5.1 Ongoing consequences of an ongoing disaster

The American Heritage Dictionary defines “aftermath” both as (1) a consequence, especially of a disaster or misfortune (e.g. famine as an aftermath of drought) and as (2) a period of time following a disastrous event (e.g. in the aftermath of war). A Google search for “Fukushima and aftermath” garners 432,000 hits. While it is true that there are consequences from Fukushima and that therefore the use of “aftermath” fits the first definition, unfortunately its use does not fit the second, for the disaster at Fukushima has not ended, nor is it likely to end within the lifetimes of anyone alive at this time (Koide 2015). This linguistic problem is not solved in other languages, for German translates “aftermath” as Nachwirkungen (after-effects), Spanish as secuelas, French as séquelles, and Japanese as youha (余波), which can also mean consequence, after-effect, secondary effect and sequel. Perhaps a neologism could be coined to describe the Fukushima disaster: “eternamath” or “dystopiamath”.

A new Japanese secrecy law introduced in 2014 will henceforth prevent oversight of the decommissioning work at the stricken Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Despite assurances from the Japanese government and TEPCO, Fukushima Daiichi is not under control: the melted cores have gone through the floor of the containment vessel and are not in a readily retrievable lump. Every day 400 tons of contaminated water contaminated with intense levels of radioactive substances are being produced. The disaster continues to recur every day and may do so for a century or more since the technology to decommission the site does not exist, as finally admitted by a senior TEPCO official. The only way forward is to create a sarcophagus as was done at Chernobyl, although that accident involved only one reactor, while Fukushima involves three. Even if this solution were resorted to, it should be noted that, 28 years later, the Chernobyl sarcophagus now needs renewing.

Alarmingly, even four years after the accident, (1) no plan exists for decommissioning and radioactive waste management at Fukushima Daiichi, there is (2) no adequate robust groundwater model, (3) no adequate safety assessment methodology, (4) no adequate safety leadership or culture or (5) management system for decommissioning the site, and (6) no waste inventory to provide reliable physical, chemical, radiological and volumetric information to support future strategic planning and decisions for waste streams. TEPCO has (7) not yet conducted a risk analysis in relation to pooled fuel and fuel debris plans, nor has it (8) yet implemented a systems analysis to help understand the integrated set of contaminated water management activities both on the land and sea-side, assess volumes of water and waste production, the impact of shifting schedules, as well as the interdependency of water management, waste management, and future decommissioning activities. TEPCO also (9) faces a huge challenge dealing with highly radioactive water onsite: a sustainable solution is needed for storing treated contaminated water containing tritium, and (10) problems of water leakage and ingress both remain unresolved. TEPCO continues to find (11) high contamination levels of cesium 137 in drainage channels that carry groundwater and runoff water either to the open sea or to the port. The IAEA recommends that TEPCO consider all options, “including the possible resumption of controlled discharges to the sea” (IAEA 2015, p. 13). Technical issues such as (12) the removal of nuclear fuel, damaged fuel and fuel debris and (13) the long-term management of radioactive waste remain unresolved. In addition, TEPCO (14) still has problems with public communication. (IAEA 2015, pp. 6, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 26, 31, 33, 38, 43, 44, 46 & 49, Normile 2011)

In terms of fallout from the disaster, the radioactive plume was advected over Eastern Honshu Island, where precipitation deposited a large fraction of cesium-137 over land surfaces. Of the total fallout until 20 April 2011, 19% was deposited over Japanese land areas. For this reason, Hiroaki Koide, Former Assistant Professor of Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute, insists that the regions of Tohoku and Kanto, which includes Tokyo, should be designated radiation-controlled areas.

The radiation exposure of the people living in the area around Fukushima prefecture may continue for centuries to come. In Fukushima Prefecture, data up to January 2013 revealed that 44.2% of 94,975 children sampled had thyroid ultrasound abnormalities, with the number and size of cysts increasing over time. Studies attest to the psychological consequences of being exposed to radiation. The disaster has left those exposed to radiation vulnerable to discrimination and stigmatization from others who see them as damaged or contaminated. In the US, the number of congenital hypothyroid cases increased in 2011, with the greatest divergence from figures in other states occurring in the period from 17 March to 30 June 2011. At the power plant, there are 10 layers of subcontractors, many of them foreign workers, who are employed by the yakuza (Japanese mafia) and are not even receiving minimum wage.

The Fukushima disaster has been compared to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but in reality they are in no way comparable. Only 800 grams of uranium was contained in the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. By contrast, at Fukushima each reactor had about 90 tons of uranium. The “hazard from a crippled nuclear power plant depends on how much radioactive fuel is on site, both in the reactors and in the storage pools.” “The Daiichi complex had a total of 1,760 metric tons of fresh and used nuclear fuel on site”, of which Daiichi reactor No. 3 contained about 90 tons, while the damaged storage pool perched in the air above reactor No. 4 contained 135 tons of spent fuel. The total of 1,760 metric tons of fuel at Daiichi is almost 10 times the 180 tons lost in the Chernobyl accident and almost 60 times the 30 tons lost in the Three Mile Island accident. (Koide 2015)

“[T]he level of radioactive contamination that the plant was spewing in the immediate aftermath of the disaster [was] estimated to be from 5,000 to 15,000 terabecquerels, according to [Ken Buesseler, a senior scientist with the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution]. For a comparison, the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima released 89 terabecquerels of cesium-137 when it exploded. In other words, Fukushima released between 56 and 168 times as much radioactive contamination as the Hiroshima atomic bomb.

“The [Japanese] government now [2013] says it is clear that 300 tons (71,895 gallons/272,152 liters) are pouring into the sea each day, enough to fill an Olympic-size swimming pool every eight days. … According to a report by the French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety, that initial breakdown caused "the largest single contribution of radionuclides to the marine environment ever observed." Some of that early release actually was intentional, because TEPCO reportedly had to dump 3 million gallons of water contaminated with low levels of radiation into the Pacific to make room in its storage ponds for more heavily contaminated water that it needed to pump out of the damaged reactors so that it could try to get them under control. … (Drinking water at 300 becquerels per liter would be approximately equivalent to one year’s exposure to natural background radiation, or 10 to 15 chest X-rays, according to the World Health Organization. And it is far in excess of WHO’s guideline advised maximum level of radioactivity in drinking water, 10 becquerels per liter.) … A mathematical model developed by Changsheng Chen of the University of Massachusetts at Dartmouth and Robert Beardsley of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute found that radioactive particles disperse through the ocean differently at different depths. “Cesium is like salt—it goes in and out of your body quickly,” he explains. “Strontium gets into your bones.”

The rapidly warming Pacific Ocean could be caused by heated groundwater and radioactive waste from the Fukushima plant flowing into the Pacific. This could be related to a number of mass die-offs recorded since 2012. In May 2012, Peru's northern beaches were declared off-limits as scientists tried to pin down what was causing the mysterious deaths of thousands of birds and dolphins. Peru said unusually warm ocean currents pushing southwards along its coast had disrupted fish distribution patterns causing around 5,000 seabirds, mostly pelicans and boobies, to starve to death. Carmen Grados, an oceanographer studying the EL Niño phenomenon, said there had been "anomalies" causing the coastal sea surface temperature to shift between 1 and 2C since February. She added that it was too early to determine whether the warming of sea surface temperatures was caused by the cyclical El Niño event.

to March 2012, some 4,000 birds, including pelicans, had been found dead along a 200 km stretch of coastline, along with at least 900 dolphins. In February 2014, another 400 dead dolphins were found on the Pacific Ocean beaches of northern Peru. In November 2014, 500 dead sea lions were found on a beach on Peru’s northern coastline. Agents said the bodies were of young as well as old animals. A similar incident had been reported earlier in the month further north, in the Piura region, where the bodies of nearly 200 sea lions, dolphins, turtles and pelicans had washed ashore.

In the year following the disaster, Pacific Bluefin tuna swimming across the entire North Pacific Ocean showed a 10-fold increase in radio cesium concentrations. A fish caught by a fisherman was found to contain more than 2,500 times the legal limit for radiation in seafood. At least 900 dolphins died in Peru in 2012.

Other species may also have been affected. “[S]kin ulcers and other conditions -- hair loss, lethargy, oozing sores, bloody mucous, congested lungs -- are affecting seals and walruses … much studying has been done to determine whether it's the result of a virus or radiation, and no tests have linked these origins to the illness, it's not yet known what the root cause is.”

The declines in numbers of birds as well as numbers of species of birds have been dramatic and Fukushima is considered to be much worse than Chernobyl. Both the biodiversity and the abundance are showing dramatic impacts in areas with higher radiation levels, even as the levels are declining.

(Koide 2015, Gutierrez 2015, Mangano & Sherman 2013, Russia Today 2013a, Stohl & others 2011, Parry 2015, ENENews 2015, Madigana & others 2012, Huffington Post 2013, Samet and Chanson 2015, ENENews 2015, Møller, Nishiumi & Mousseau 2015, IAEA 2015, RTE News 2012, NBC News 2014, The Guardian 2012, Burke 2012, Yamamoto 2014, Marshall & Reardon 2011, Kiger n.d.)

Below is given a non-exhaustive list of the ongoing consequences of an ongoing disaster, which could otherwise be called the Fukushima Daiichi eternamath.

Hiroaki Koide, Former Assistant Professor of Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute, made the following pronouncements at a press conference given at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan in April 2015 (video):
- “The Japanese government has issued a declaration that this is an emergency situation. As a result, normal laws do not have to be followed.”
- “Every day 400 tons of contaminated water is being produced.”
- “10 layers of subcontractors … are not even receiving minimum wage. … [There are] a large number of foreign workers working at Fukushima.”
- “LDP Shinzo Abe … gave a speech on the international stage where he said the accident was ‘under control’ – workers in fact on site are being irradiated. This will continue for decades to come. Every single moment the people in this area around Fukushima prefecture and this exposure may continue for centuries to come.”
- “[I]t is possible that the melted cores have gone through the floor of the containment vessel and is [sic] dispersed, not in a readily retrievable lump. … Impossible to remove the spent fuel. [We] must create a sarcophagus as at Chernobyl.”
- “29 years after Chernobyl, the sarcophagus is cracking so they are making a second one to cover it. Chernobyl was only one reactor, but at Fukushima there are three emitting radiation – it will take hundreds of years to deal with. The timeline must be centuries-based.” (Koide 2015).
“The question has been raised as to whether [a rapidly warming Pacific Ocean] could be caused by heated groundwater and radioactive waste from the Fukushima plant flowing into the Pacific, thereby slowly raising ocean temperatures over the past few years. Since this radioactive material has been continuously flowing from the plant over the past four years, this mass could have drifted out to sea and could still be heating water as a side effect of its ongoing radioactive decay.” (Gutierrez 2015) 2013)
“The number of congenital hypothyroid cases in these five states [on the Pacific Ocean] from March 17-December 31, 2011 was 16% greater than for the same period in 2010, compared to a 3% decline in 36 other US States (p < 0.03). The greatest divergence in these two groups (+28%) occurred in the period March 17-June 30.” (Mangano & Sherman 2013).
“The Tenth Report of the Fukushima Prefecture Health Management Survey … with data up to January 21, 2013, revealed that 44.2 percent of 94,975 children sampled had thyroid ultrasound abnormalities. The number of abnormalities has also been increasing over time as well as the proportion of children with nodules equal to and larger than 5.1 mm and any size cysts have increased.” (Russia Today 2013a)
Exactly during and following the period of the strongest 137 Cs emissions on 14 and 15 March as well as after another period with strong emissions on 19 March, the radioactive plume was advected over Eastern Honshu Island, where precipitation deposited a large fraction of 137 Cs on land surfaces. … Altogether, we estimate that 19% of the total fallout until 20 April [was] deposited over Japanese land areas.” (Stohl & others 2011)
From the Asahi Shimbun newspaper, May 1, 2015: Yauemon Sato, the ninth-generation chief of a sake brewery operating here since 1790 [and president of electric power company Aizu Denryoku] said the nuclear disaster “continues to recur every day … And the disaster has yet to end. It continues to recur every day. More than 300 tons of water, contaminated with intense levels of radioactive substances, are being generated every day.” (ENENews 2015).
“We report unequivocal evidence that Pacific bluefin tuna, Thunnus orientalis, transported Fukushima-derived radionuclides across the entire North Pacific Ocean. … [They] showed a 10-fold increase in radio cesium concentrations.” (Madigana & others 2012)
“A Fukushima Fish With 2,500 Times The Radiation Limit Found Two Years After Nuclear Disaster”. According to French newspaper Le Monde, the fish … “contained more than 2,500 times the legal limit for radiation in seafood”. (Huffington Post 2013)
“’Tokyo Electric has been playing a game of whack-a-mole with problems at the site,’ Trade and Economy Minister Toshimitsu Motegi said in a televised interview. (Russia Today 2013c)

“In addition to the initial release of radioactive material into the ocean, water leakage at the Fukushima plant continues to be a problem, four years after the accident. … [S]tudies attest to the psychological consequences of being exposed to radiation. In Japan, the Fukushima disaster has … left those exposed vulnerable to discrimination and stigmatization from others who see them as damaged or contaminated.” (Samet and Chanson 2015)

“Fukushima is considered to be much worse than Chernobyl according to the journal Environmental Indicators: "[A]mong the 14 species occurring at both [Chernobyl and Fukushima the] slope of the relationship between abundance and radiation for the 14 common species was... much stronger at Fukushima." Since 2011, the report adds, "the effects of radiation on abundance became much more severe." … “The declines have been really dramatic… now we see this really striking drop-off in numbers of birds as well as numbers of species of birds. So both the biodiversity and the abundance are showing dramatic impacts in these areas with higher radiation levels, even as the levels are declining.” University of South Carolina biologist Dr. Tim Mousseau. (ENENews (2015)
“Abstract: Species differ in their susceptibility to radiation because of differences in their ability to sustain toxic and genetic effects caused by radiation. We censused breeding birds in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, during 2011-2014 to test whether the abundance and diversity of birds became increasingly negatively affected by radiation over time. The abundance of birds decreased with increasing levels of background radiation, with significant interspecific variation. Even though levels of background radiation decreased over time, the relationship between abundance and radiation became more negative over time. The relationship between abundance and radiation became less negative with increasing trophic levels. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the negative effects of radiation on abundance and species richness accumulate over time.” (Møller, Nishiumi & Mousseau 2015)
“[S]kin ulcers and other conditions -- hair loss, lethargy, oozing sores, bloody mucous, congested lungs -- are affecting seals and walruses … much studying has been done to determine whether it's the result of a virus or radiation, and no tests have linked these origins to the illness, it's not yet known what the root cause is.” (Burke 2012)
Four years after the Fukushima Daiichi disaster, in its February 2015 report, the IAEA reports that “the situation at the site remains very complex [and a] range of challenging issues remain, such as”:
- “Persistent underground water ingress to main buildings”
- “The accumulation of contaminated water on-site”
- “The long-term management of radioactive waste|
- “The removal of nuclear fuel, damaged fuel and fuel debris.”

(IAEA 2015, p. 6)

Confirming the statement made by Akira Ono, Chief of the Fukushima nuclear power station, that the technology needed to decommission the three melted-down reactors does not exist and he has no idea how it will be developed (Parry 2015), the IAEA February 2015 report reveals that, after four years, there is still no plan for decommissioning the site:
- “The IAEA team encourages TEPCO to develop an integrated plan for decommissioning and radioactive waste management at Fukushima Daiichi NPS.” (p. 9)
Nor is there an adequate groundwater model:
- “The IAEA team advises that TEPCO should consider producing a better calibrated, robust groundwater model” (pp. 14 & 38)
Nor is there an adequate safety assessment methodology:
- “The further development of a sound safety assessment methodology merits continued diligent attention – both within the site operator and in its interfaces with the regulatory body.” (Advisory Point 14, p. 26)
Nor does TEPCO yet have adequate communication systems:
- “The IAEA experts’ view that TEPCO’s problem of public communication … may be attributed to lack of coordination between Fukushima Daiichi NPS site and TEPCO’s head office.” (p. 49)
Nor does TEPCO yet have an adequate safety leadership or culture:
- IAEA “strongly encourages TEPCO in their progress to reinforce safety leadership and safety culture” (p. 8)
Nor does TEPCO yet have an adequate management system for decommissioning the site:
- IAEA “strongly encourages TEPCO” to develop “a Management System appropriate to radioactive waste management and decommissioning.” (p. 8)
Nor does TEPCO have an adequate waste inventory:
- “The IAEA team encourages the FDEC [Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) Engineering Company, variously called a “branch” (p. 6) and a “division” of TEPCO (p. 8)] to continue working on developing a waste inventory providing reliable physical, chemical, radiological and volumetric information, even prior to availability of the new Analysis Centre, to support future strategic planning and decisions for the waste streams.” (p. 11)
Nor has TEPCO considered conducting a systems analysis to tackle the problems:
- “As the multiple water capture, water treatment, and water storage activities are highly interdependent and complex, TEPCO may also consider implementing a ‘systems analysis’ with associated system dynamics computer tools to help understand the integrated set of contaminated water management activities both on the land and sea-side, assess volumes of water and waste production, the impact of shifting schedules, as well as the interdependency of water management, waste management, and future decommissioning activities.” (p. 13)
Nor has TEPCO considered conducting a risk analysis in relation to pooled fuel and fuel debris plans:
- IAEA encourages the newly formed national authority, the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning Facilitation Corporation (NDF), “to conduct a risk analysis in relation to pooled fuel and fuel debris plans; taking into account conventional safety and cumulative dose to workers.” (p. 43)
TEPCO is considerably challenged by groundwater coming into the site:
- “Management of contaminated water and groundwater ingress is a major on-going challenge at the site that needs to be addressed and requires considerable effort.” (p. 31)
TEPCO also faces a huge challenge dealing with highly radioactive water:
- “The presence of highly radioactive water in the sea-side trenches of Units 2, 3 and 4 has been a major cause of concern because of the risk of leakage and release to the sea.” (p. 33)
- “The … present plan to store the treated contaminated water containing tritium in above ground tanks, with a capacity of 800,000 m3, is at best a temporary measure while a more sustainable solution is needed. … [all options should be considered], including the possible resumption of controlled discharges to the sea.”(p. 13)
The radiation exposure of TEPCO’s workers remains an issue:
- “TEPCO should pay due attention to the radiation exposure of the workers, especially in areas where the dose rate is high” (p. 46)
And highly contaminated rainwater was still leaking into the sea four years later:
- “TEPCO announced (on 24th Feb) the detection of relatively high contamination levels (up to 23,000 Bq/L of 137Cs) in rainwater accumulated on the Unit 2 service entrance building rooftop and identified this as a source of high contamination levels in K drainage channel water. This is one of several drainage channels that carry ground water and runoff water from surfaces at the site, either to the open sea or to the port … The contamination at the rooftop was attributed to radioactive materials released at the time of the accident.” (p. 44)
“Inspections of containers holding contaminated water at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant found that at least 10 percent [of 1,300] have leaks, which could trigger a hydrogen explosion.” … [G]ases appear to have accumulated in sediment at the bottom of the containers, expanding the volume of the liquid. … “[A] spark caused by static electricity could cause a container to explode,” [a Nuclear Regulation Authority] official said. … Although all the lids of the containers were supposed to be fitted with pressure-release valves to allow gases to escape … “there may be as many as 333 that are also defective”, a TEPCO official said (Kumai 2015, The Mainichi 2015 & Demetriou 2015)

5.2 Conclusion

NAIIC Chairman Kurokawa may well be right in his assessment that the disaster at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is largely attributable to Japanese culture. Despite the fact that over four years have passed since 11 March 2011, it remains highly questionable whether any progress at all has been made in cleaning up the area, rehousing the evacuees, protecting the population or finding a technological solution to retrieve the three nuclear cores that have melted through their containments and disappeared underground, where they are unstoppably polluting groundwater that ends up in the Pacific. Indeed, finding a solution may take hundreds of years or may yet prove impossible.

In a climate of business as usual, Japanese government agencies appear to have returned to their former complacency and yakuza subcontractors are allowed to pay less than the minimum wage to the unqualified and inexperienced workers – some of them former homeless people – who have been engaged to clean up the plant. Many of them have been ordered to cover the radiation dosimeters intended to protect them so that they can work beyond the legal limit for exposure. As more and more groundwater is polluted on a daily basis, unthinkable quantities of irradiated water are released into the sea and dead marine wildlife mysteriously washes up with skin lesions on beaches up and down the west coast of the Americas, the scale of the consequences for people, animals, marine life and the environment remains uncalculated and incalculable.

At the time of the disaster, Fairewinds Energy Education was staffed only by Arnie Gundersen and Maggie Gundersen. When he heard what had happened in Japan, Gundersen told his wife that he would be spending the rest of his life doing what he could to help mitigate the disaster and prevent others. Although he had correctly guessed that the General Electric Mark I reactor would be the cause of the next major nuclear accident, he could neither have foreseen that an accident would take place in Japan nor have prepared for it in terms of raising his intercultural competence in advance. He became so much in demand for interviews with news agencies in Japan and around the world that he devoted his time to monitoring the status of the accident site rather than studying Japanese culture.

Gundersen lacked the time, staff and organizational capacity to improve his effectiveness by acquiring intercultural knowledge. Despite this, his demeanor in all his interactions with Japanese counterparts was and remains even-handed, respectful and culturally sensitive. He has partnered effectively with many Japanese counterparts and even published a book in Japanese, at the request of a Japanese publisher. He speaks often in Japan and deals courteously and patiently with his interpreters. He invited a Japanese colleague to join the Board of Directors of Fairewinds. Even had he been armed with the information provided in this paper, it is doubtful that he could have done more or better than he did instinctively. Perhaps he could have tried to team up with Japanese anti-nuclear politicians such as former Prime Minister Naoto Kan or actor-turned politician Taro Yamamoto, or with anti-nuclear academics such as Katsuhiko Ishibashi or Hiroaki Koide. Had he been fully informed about Japanese cultural traits, at least he would not have made the mistake of assuming that, in Japan, what you see is what you get, for the opposite is in fact the case: Japan is a country where appearances can be, and are intended to be, deceiving.

By contrast, Richard A. Meserve, former Chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), had clearly benefited from his affiliation with a large organization. His recommendations to NAIIC on 27 February 2012, listed below, showed that the NRC was well aware of the glaring failures that had occurred in the handling of the disaster, even if it was not aware of their cultural origins (NAIIC 2012, p. 74):

Regulatory agencies should not have a passive mind-set towards security and safety issues
In an emergency situation, the operator should make decisions and avoid asking the government
Nuclear plant operators must be competent to make decisions
Regulatory agencies must require sound decisions from the operator and implement decisions to prevent escalation of damages
Regulatory agencies must maintain independence from the operators and the government
Regulatory agencies should clarify the roles of the operator and the government, as well as the chain of command, and ensure that roles are rehearsed repeatedly
Decision-making should be transparent and participants should feel able to openly provide opinions to gain trust
Japan should learn from the NRC model, where the majority of employees spend their entire careers on nuclear safety, and should provide proper incentives to experts
In Japan, professionals trained in rotational positions within the bureaucratic entities often proved dysfunctional in emergency situations
Nuclear accident investigations should be independent and transparent.

The multiple demonstrations, anti-nuclear blogs and numerous dissenting opinions being expressed throughout Japan are evidence that Japanese are no less capable of independent thinking and action than any other nationality. However, the cultural factors named by Kurokawa may make it difficult for dissenting voices to be heard and dissenting actions to be accepted. The Japanese people have appeared passive in the face of manipulation by the government and oligarchy in recent times, but Fukushima may be the tipping point. It may be time for the Japanese to put survival ahead of imperial protocol, for example, and lend support to rather than chasten a fellow Japanese willing to buck tradition by handing the Emperor a letter about Fukushima, as Taro Yamamoto did. Such courageous activists may be the Japanese people’s best hope for ensuring their own protection and government accountability.

This paper is dedicated to the forgotten evacuees of Tohoku, to the 12 million people with no option other than to live in an irradiated Tokyo, and to all the people of Japan, from whom the Japanese government continues to hide the truth about the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and the consequent worldwide dispersal of radiation. The cultural traits that may have contributed to exacerbating the nuclear emergency exist everywhere, but may be stronger at this time in Japan for historical reasons. Many Japanese, however, are going against the cultural grain to voice their dissent, and pointing out an alternative path, one of openness and accountability. It is beholden on all people of conscience, Japanese and others, to follow their example by remaining informed and holding all our leaders accountable. The dissenting Japanese experts, politicians and protesters must be heard and supported. The world’s worst nuclear accident to date is the best evidence yet of the smallness and interconnectedness of our world. If we fail to take this opportunity to work together while fully respecting and honoring our diversity, we will have effectively signed our own death warrant.

Dedicated to Kenji Hasegawa and Naoto Matsumura, two Fukushima farmers

Kenji Hasegawa and Naoto Matsumura were farmers in Fukushima Prefecture
until the Fukushima Daiichi disaster

Matsumura decided to return alone to his farm, where he now cares for his animals, completely isolated in an irradiated landscape abandoned by its former residents.
Matsumura opposes the killing of animals in radiation-controlled zones.

“You have fish in the rivers and wild plants in the mountains. … But we’ve lost it all.”

Hasegawa now lives in temporary housing for evacuees. He and his wife cared for their
contaminated cows by milking them everyday and pouring out the toxic milk
until eventually they had to slaughter all of their beloved animals.

Hasegawa recalls his grandchildren visiting him every day after school to say hi
to their grandpa and the cows. That life is over now -- all that remains are memories.

“I almost wish I could forget those happy times.”

原発20キロ圏内に生きる男 – Alone in the Zone

Two Fukushima farmers: one an evacuee, the other alone

CLICK HERE TO WATCH VIDEO

References

ABC News (2011, December 16). Fukushima plant reaches cold shutdown. Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-12-16/fukushima-plant-reaches-cold-shutdown/3735796

Abegg, Lily (1952). The Mind of East Asia (translated from the German Ostasien Denkt Anders, by A. J. Crick and E. E. Thomas). London and New York: Thames and Hudson. Retrieved from the website of the Universal Library at http://archive.org/details/mindofeastasia030168mbp.

Airi, R. & Meshkati, N. (2014). Onagawa: The Japanese nuclear power plant that didn’t melt down on 3/11. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. October 3, 2014. Retrieved from http://thebulletin.org/onagawa-japanese-nuclear-power-plant-didn%E2%80%99t-melt-down-311

Aoki, M. (2013, May 9). Fukushima activist fights fear and discrimination based on radiation. Japan Times. Retrieved from www.japantimes.co.jp/news/213/5/9/national/fukushima-activist-fights-fear-and-discrimination-based-on-radiation/

Associated Press (2013, Nov. 7). Anti-nuclear Japanese lawmaker attacked from all sides for handing letter to Emperor Akihito. Retrieved from www.foxnews.com/world/2013/11/07/anti-nuclear-japanese-lawmaker-attacked-from-all-sides-for-handing-letter-to/

BBC News (2014, Nov. 24). Peru investigates deaths of 500 sea lions on north coast. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-30172690

Before It’s News (2011, August 19). Another One: A strong earthquake measuring 6.8 on the Richter Scale has struck off Japan’s northeastern coast, the Japan Meteorological Agency reported Friday. Retrieved from http://beforeitsnews.com/japan-earthquake/2011/08/977722-977722.html

Beyond Nuclear (2015, April 19). Judge Rules Against Japan Nuclear Restart, Cleanup of Melted Reactors Non-Existent. Global Research. Retrieved from www.globalresearch.ca/judge-rules-against-japan-nuclear-restart-cleanup-of-melted-reactors-non-existent/5443820

Burke, J. (2012, March 21). Illness plaguing seals and walruses brings disease hunters to Alaska. Alaska Dispatch News. Retrieved from https://www.adn.com/alaska-news/article/illness-plaguing-seals-and-walruses-brings-disease-hunters-alaska/2012/03/22/

Buruma, I. (2009). The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan. London: Atlantic Books.

Clark, G. (2014, February 21). Your Ancestors, Your Fate. The New York Times. Retrieved from https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/21/your-fate-thank-your-ancestors/

Demetriou, D. (2015, May 25). Fukushima leak 'could cause hydrogen explosion' at nuclear plant. Daily Telegraph. Retrieved from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/11627983/Fukushima-leak-could-cause-hydrogen-explosion-at-nuclear-plant.html

ENENews (2015, April 17). Fukushima Worse than Chernobyl: “Effects of Radiation Have Become Much More Severe” — “Enormous Decline” in Animal Species. Retrieved from www.globalresearch.ca/fukushima-worse-than-chernobyl-effects-of-radiation-have-become-much-more-severe-enormous-decline-in-animal-species/5444263

ENENews (2015, May 4). Fukushima’s “Caldrons of Hell”: More than 300 Tons of Highly Radioactive Water Generated Daily. Global Research. Retrieved from https://www.globalresearch.ca/fukushimas-caldrons-of-hell-more-than-300-tons-of-highly-radioactive-water-generated-daily/544716

Fairewinds (2015a). Meet the Crew. Retrieved from https://www.fairewinds.org/meet-the-crew

Fairewinds (2015b) Fukushima's Refugees: Why Have They Been Abandoned? February 3, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.fairewinds.org/nuclear-energy-education/?offset=1392322271000&category=Videos+%26+Audio

Gladwell, Malcolm (2008). Outliers: The Story of Success. London, Allen Lane.

Goldman, L. (2011, Feb. 25). The 14 Most Workaholic Countries In The World. Business Insider. Retrieved from www.businessinsider.com/countries-with-the-most-workaholics-2011-2?op=1&IR=T

The Guardian (2012, May 9). Mass pelican deaths in Peru caused by starvation, study finds. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/may/09/peru-pelicans-starvation

Gutierrez, D. (2015, April 7). Fukushima Disaster Caused at Least 1,232 Fatalities in 2014 as Radiation Death Rate Accelerates. Global Research. Retrieved from http://www.globalresearch.ca/fukushima-disaster-caused-at-least-1232-fatalities-in-2014-as-radiation-death-rate-accelerates/5441390

Global Research (2015, April 28). Reports on Warm ‘Blob’ in Pacific Ocean Pretend It Can’t Be Related to Fukushima. Retrieved from https://www.naturalnews.com/049523_pacific_ocean_warm_blob_climate_anomalies.html

Halperin, M & Hofsommer, M (2014, Oct. 5). Japan Wrongly Blames U.S. For Repressive Japanese Secrecy Law. The World Post. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mort-halperin/japan-wrongly-blames-us_b_5936726.html

History.com Staff (2010). Website: History.com. Commodore Perry sails into Tokyo Bay. Retrieved from www.history.com/this-day-in-history/commodore-perry-sails-into-tokyo-bay

Hofstede and others (n.d.). Country cultural comparisons: US and Japan. Retrieved from Hofstede and others website: https://geerthofstede.com/country-comparison-graphs/

Huffington Post (2013, January 23). Fukushima Fish With 2,500 Times The Radiation Limit Found Two Years After Nuclear Disaster. Retrieved from https://www.huffpost.com/entry/fukushima-fish-2500-times-radiation-limit-nuclear-disaster_n_2536775

International Atomic Energy Agency (2015a, May 28). Fukushima Nuclear Accident Update Log, 12 April 2011. Retrieved from website (updated 28 May 2015) at: www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/fukushima-nuclear-accident-update-log-15

International Atomic Energy Agency (2015b). IAEA International Peer Review Mission on Mid-and-Long-Term Roadmap towards the decommissioning of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1-4 (Third Mission): Mission Report to the Government of Japan, Tokyo and Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, 9-17 February 2015. Retrieved from www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/missionreport170215.pdf

Jirousek, C. (1995). Website:. Japan: Historic Background. Retrieved from Cornell University: Art, Design and Visual thinking website at: http://char.txa.cornell.edu/NONWEST/JAPAN/japanhis.htm

Ishibashi, K. (2007, August 11). Why Worry? Japan's Nuclear Plants at Grave Risk From Quake Damage. International Herald Tribune/Asahi Shimbun. Reposted at Japan Focus on August 11, 2007. Retrieved from www.japanfocus.org/-Ishibashi-Katsuhiko/2495/article.html

Jones, K. (1989). The Social Face of Buddhism: An Approach to Political and Social Activism. London: Wisdom Publications.

Kiger, P. (n.d.). Fukushima's Radioactive Water Leak: What You Should Know. National Geographic News. Retrieved from https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/130807-fukushima-radioactive-water-leak

Keller, A. (2013, June 13). Cleanup From Fukushima Daiichi: Technological Disaster Or Crisis In Governance? Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20160306140111/http://www.fairewinds.org/nuclear-energy-education/cleanup-from-fukushima-daiichi-technological-disaster-or-crisis-in-governance

Kim, Min-Sun (2002). Non-Western Perspectives on Human Communication: Implications for Theory and Practice. London, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Klein, A. C. (1995). Meeting the Great Bliss Queen: Buddhists, Feminists and the Art of the Self. Boston: Beacon. Cited in Kim (2002).

Koide, H. (2015, April 24). Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. Press Conference: Hiroaki Koide, Former Assistant Professor of Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute. Retrieved from www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=nCbXX3DURd0 - t=690

Kumai, H. (2015, May 23). Risk of hydrogen explosion from leaking containers at Fukushima plant. The Asahi Shimbun. Retrieved from
https://alternativefreepress.com/2015/05/23/risk-hydrogen-explosion-leaking-containers-fukushima-plant/

Kuntjara, E. (2004). “Cultural transfer in EFL writing: a look at contrastive rhetoric on English and Indonesian.” K@ta : a Biannual Publication on the Study of Language and Literature, (6)1.

Labor Video Project (2012). Fukushima Never Again. Video. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LU-Z4VLDGxU

Lehmann, C. (2013, August 4). 6.0 Quake Shakes Crippled Fukushima Power Plant. NSNBC International. Retrieved from http://nsnbc.me/2013/08/04/6-0-quake-shakes-crippled-fukushima-power-plant/ 6.0 Quake Shakes Crippled Fukushima Power Plant (deleted)

Liu, S., Volčič, Z. & Gallois, C. (2011). Introducing Intercultural Communication. Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington D.C.: Sage Publications.

Madigana & others (2012). Pacific bluefin tuna transport Fukushima-derived radionuclides from Japan to California. Hopkins Marine Station, Stanford University and School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences, Stony Brook University. Retrieved from www.pnas.org/content/109/24/9483.full.pdf+html?sid=2c2c55ab-08dc-4d6c-a665-23d5eacf1b8c

Marshall, E. & Reardon, S. (2011, March 17). How Much Fuel Is at Risk at Fukushima? ScienceInsider. Retrieved from http://news.sciencemag.org/2011/03/how-much-fuel-risk-fukushima

The Mainichi (2015, June 2). Container for Fukushima waste found without gas venting holes. Retrieved from http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20150523p2a00m0na015000c.html (deleted)

Majiroxnews (2011, February 10). Politician claims Fukushima children treated like traitors for shunning milk. Retrieved from www.majiroxnews.com/2011/10/02/politician-claims-fukushima-children-treated-like-traitors-for-shunning-milk/ (deleted)

Mangano, J. & Sherman, D. (2013). Elevated airborne beta levels in Pacific/West Coast US States and trends in hypothyroidism among newborns after the Fukushima nuclear meltdown. Open Journal of Pediatrics, 3, 1-9. Retrieved from www.scirp.org/journal/PaperDownload.aspx?paperID=28599

McCool, Matthew (2009). Writing Around the World: A Guide to Writing Across Cultures. London and New York: Continuum.

McCormack, Gavan (2011). Hubris Punished: Japan as Nuclear State (or Japan's Nuclear Village 日本の原子力ムラ). The Asia-Pacific Journal 9(16). Retrieved from http://japanfocus.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3822

Møller, A. P., Nishiumi, I. & Mousseau, T. A. (2015). Cumulative effects of radioactivity from Fukushima on the abundance and biodiversity of birds. Journal of Ornithology. DOI 10.1007/s10336-015-1197-2. Retrieved from www.researchgate.net/publication/273770328_Cumulative_effects_of_radioactivity_from_Fukushima_on_the_abundance_and_biodiversity_of_birds

Nader, R. (2014, January 24-26). The Fukushima Secrecy Syndrome. Counterpunch. Retrieved from www.counterpunch.org/2014/01/24/the-fukushima-secrecy-syndrome/

National Diet of Japan (2012). The official report of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission: Executive Summary. Retrieved from www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf

NBC News (2014, Feb 4). Mystery of 400 dead dolphins found on north Peru coast. Retrieved from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/mystery-400-dead-dolphins-found-north-peru-coast-flna2d12054082

NHK (2015, March 31). NHK ‘Nuclear Watch’ transcript: Decommissioning Chief Speaks Out. Retrieved from www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/features/201503312108.html (deleted but could be this (same date) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-cwssbyHT_c)

Nihon Shinbun Kyokai (2006). The Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association Kisha Club Guidelines. Retrieved from www.pressnet.or.jp/english/about/guideline/

Normile, D. (2013, Dec. 6). Updated: Over Scientists' Objections, Japan Adopts State Secrets Law. American Association for the Advancement of Science. Science. Retrieved from http://news.sciencemag.org/asiapacific/2013/12/updated-over-scientists-objections-japan-adopts-state-secrets-law

Nuclear Energy Institute (2011, December 2, 2011). Ask an Expert. Retrieved from
http://safetyfirst.nei.org/ask-an-expert/question-what-is-cold-shutdown/ (deleted)

Nisbett, Richard E. (2005). The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think Differently … and Why. London, Boston: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.

Normile, D. (2011, May 17). Utility: Fukushima Cores More Damaged Than Thought.
ScienceInsider. Retrieved from http://news.sciencemag.org/policy/2011/05/utility-fukushima-cores-more-damaged-thought

Oiwa, Y. (2012, March 9). High thyroid radiation levels found in Fukushima residents. Asahi Shimbun. Retrieved from http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/ fukushima/AJ201203090071
(deleted, but try Lessons from Fukushima: Latest Findings of Thyroid Cancer After the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident (2018) available from https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/28954584/)

Ooms, H. (1996). Tokugawa Village Practice: Class, Status, Power, Law. Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press. Retrieved from http://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft0000034x&chunk.id=d0e23406&toc.depth=1&toc.id=&brand=ucpress

Parry, R.L. (2015, March 28). Japan faces 200-year wait for Fukushima cleanup. The Times. Retrieved from http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/asia/article4394978.ece

Rickards, R. C. (1991). Book review: Orr, R. M. (1990). The Emergence of Japan’s Foreign Aid Power. New York: Columbia University Press in The Journal of Asian Studies. 50(3), 699. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/2057611

RTE News (2012, May 9). Peru investigates mysterious deaths of dolphins and birds. Retrieved from http://www.rte.ie/news/special-reports/2012/0508/320223-peru/

Ruff, T. (2012, March 13). Don’t hold your breath for Fukushima’s radiation toll. Website: The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/dont-hold-your-breath-for-fukushimas-radiation-toll-5749

Russia Today (2013a, February 18). Fukushima kids have skyrocketing number of thyroid abnormalities – report. Retrieved from http://on.rt.com/7ykz0q

Russia Today (2013b, July 9). Hero Fukushima ex-manager who foiled nuclear disaster dies of cancer. Retrieved from http://rt.com/news/fukushima-manager-yoshida-dies-cancer-829/

Russia Today (2013c, Sept. 4). Radiation readings at Fukushima plant hit new high. Retrieved from http://rt.com/news/fukushima-radiation-new-high-374/

Russia Today (2013d, Sept. 12). Fukushima ‘not under control’ – TEPCO official refutes PM's assurances. Retrieved from http://rt.com/news/fukushima-under-control-tepco-819/

Samet, J. M. and Chanson, D. (2015). Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant Disaster: How many people were affected? 2015 Report (March 9, 2015). Retrieved from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2015_fukushima_report.pdf.

Sieg, L. and Takenaka, T. (2013, Oct. 24). Japan secrecy act stirs fears about press freedom, right to know. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-secrecy-idUSBRE99N1EC20131025

Slodkowski, A. & Saito, M. (2013, July 30). Fukushima clean-up turns toxic for Japan's Tepco. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-fukushima-nuclear-idUSL4N0FZ31J20130730

Spector, H. (2012). Fukushima Daiichi: A never-ending story of pain or outrage? Transnational Curriculum Inquiry. 9(1), 80-97.

Sputnik (2015, February 26). Busted! Fukushima Operator Concealed Radioactive Leak for Nearly a Year. 2015. Retrieved from http://sptnkne.ws/kJs (deleted)

Stohl, A. and others (2011). Xenon-133 and caesium-137 releases into the atmosphere from the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant: determination of the source term, atmospheric dispersion, and deposition. Atmos. Chem. Phys. Discuss., 11, 28319–28394. Retrieved from www.atmos-chem-phys-discuss.net/11/28319/2011/acpd-11-28319-2011.pdf

Suseno, S.J. (1996). Etika Jawa: sebuah analisa falsafi tentang kebijaksanaan
hidup Jawa. Jakarta: PT. Gramedia. Cited in Kuntjara (2004).

Szczepanski, K. (n.d.). The Four-Tiered Class System of Feudal Japan. Retrieved from http://asianhistory.about.com/od/japan/p/ShogJapanClass.htm

Tabuchi, H. & Inoue, M. (2013, Jan. 7). New York Times. In Japan, a Painfully Slow Sweep. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/business/japans-cleanup-after-a-nuclear-accident-is-denounced.html

TranslatorsCafe (n.d.). Website available at: www.translatorscafe.com

Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior In differing social contexts. Psychological Review, (96), pp. 506-520. Cited in Kim (2002).

United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (2014). Fact Sheet on UNSCEAR Fukushima Report. Retrieved from http://radiationeffects.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/UNSCEAR-Fukushima-Factsheet.pdf

Vansteenburgh, M. (2006). Edo Period Japan: 250 Years of Peace. Legal Systems Very Different From Our Own. Retrieved from www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Course_Pages/Legal_Systems_Very_Different_13/final_papers_06/Tokugawa.html

Tokugawa Ieyasu and the Edo Period (1603-1867). Retrieved from Facts and Details website at: http://factsanddetails.com/japan/cat16/sub107/item506.html

Wikipedia (n.d.). Entry on: Gaman. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaman_%28term%29

World Health Organization (2013). Health risk assessment from the nuclear accident after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami based on a preliminary dose estimation. Retrieved from http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/78218/1/9789241505130_eng.pdf

World Nuclear Association (2014). Nuclear Power Plants and Earthquakes. Retrieved from
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/nuclear-power-plants-and-earthquakes.aspx

Yamamoto, T. (2014, Nov. 20). Japan Diet Member Taro Yamamoto On Fukushima, War, Privatization & TPP. Labor Video Project. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bySXUAXt5hE

Xinhua (2010, June 13). 6.2-magnitude quake hits Japan's Fukushima Prefecture. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/13/c_13348446.htm (deleted)